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PREFACE
Whi l e often overshadowed by faculty research, the efforts
of students should not be overlooked, and this journal hopefull y
will encourage scholarly research by students and provide a means
by which their efforts will be recognized. Phi Alpha Theta is
greatly indebted to the History Department of Western Kentucky
University headed by Dr. Richard Troutman. We are grateful to
our Consulting Editors, Dr. Charles Bussey , Dr. Carol Crowe Carraco,
and Dr. David Lee, for their assistance in this project . A special
thanks goes to Mr. A. T . Stephens for designing our cover. For
her tireless and exacting effort Phi Alpha Theta thanks our typist,
Mrs. Jane Wilson . Our most profound debt of gratitude goes to the
contributing writers--those who were published and those who were
not - -that constitute a group which forms the heart of any publication.
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HENRY WIRZ :
THE LAST VICTH1 OF ANDERSONVILLE
The war was over, but four yea rs of mounting hatred could
not be swept away with the defeat of the Confederacy.
Living
skeletons had made their way to the Nor th as proof of the horrible
treatment Union prisoners had suffered at the h a nds of their Rebel
captors.
Stories had begun spreading months before the "Tar's end,
but as the subject of prisoners of war developed into a raging
controversy, Andersonville became the symbol of all the misery and
suffering.
Someone was to blame for the atrocities; someone would
pay!
In 1865 when Northern, vindictive eyes were directed to the
Andersonville commandant, Henry Wirz became the most hated man in
America.
Was he Satan incarnate, or was he the Andersonville
scapegoat--a minor figure in American history who was used by the
powerful and condemned by the p ublic and the press before his trial
began?
The facts of his early life are few and enigmatic.
Heinrich
Hartman Wirz was born in Zurich, Switzerland, on November 25, 1 822
or 1823.
There are conflicting reports concerning his professional
training and career.
He may have spent some of his time working
with his father as a tailor; others suggest that he spent nine
years in the European military, while some say that he held medical degrees from the Universities of Paris and Berlin and that he
was a practicing medical doctor, not a surgeon. l
Ovid Futch concludes that he had no medical credentials; rather, that he was a
bath attendant during the time when respected medical men used bath
treatments.
He adds that it is very unlik e ly that if he had had
medical training, the Confederacy would have failed to assign him
to the medical service. 2
In 1845 Wirz married Emilie Oschwald.
They became the parents
of one daughter and one son.
Four years later he immigrated to
the United States without his family.
Whether his wife had died,
or whether the marriage had ended in divorce, is not evident. 3
Some, accusing him of having money problems wh ich led to trouble
with the law, claim that he likely was banished by the Swiss
government after serving a term for forger y and embezzlement. 4
He arrived in America in 1849, a trained physician according
to some, an imposter according to others.
He first worked as a
weave r in a Nassach usetts factory and later became an assistant
to a doctor in Hopkinsville, Kentucky.
He soon moved to Louisville,
where he began working for Dr. Edward Caspari.
After a short while,
he moved to Cadiz, Kentucky, and began practicing medicine on his
Denise Ruth Walker
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own . There he married !1rs . Elizabeth Wolf , a widow with two children . The next year Cora , his last child, was born. Wirz and his
nel, family moved to l"li l liken ' s Bend , Louisiana , where he established
a medical practice. S
James Page and Darrett Rutman have written that at the outbreak of the war he had a l arge and profitab l e medical practice ,
whi l e Futch says he possibly served as the doctor for the s l aves
on the Marshall planta t ion . Futch , apparently influenced by nega tive accounts , interpre t s Hirz ' s various moves as further evidence
of fraudulent attempts to practice medicine . 6
On June 16 , 1861 , Wirz enlisted as a private in the Fourth
Louisiana Infantry . He rose rapid l y in the Confederate army , earn ing the rank of sergeant within a year . 7 During the Battle of
Seven Pines he received an incurable wound in his right arm . Eleven
days later he was promoted to captain for gallantry on the battlefie l d . Unfit for duty at the front , he was assigned to command the
Union prisoners at Tuscaloosa , Alabama , under the direction of
General John Winder . With his health soon failing him , Wirz applied
for a fur l ough , and on December 19 , 1862 , he sailed for Europe as
a Confederate emissary to Paris and Berlin . He remained in Europe
for over a year , until February , 1864 .
In Paris unsuccessful surgery was performed on his right arm . The wound was to remain a
source of nagging pain for the rest of his life.
After his return ,
he was assigned to command the prison interior at Andersonvi l le ,
(!larch 27 , 1864) where he was to have control over discipline and
facilities. 8 The command wou l d make him infamous , for the names
Wirz and Andersonville were destined to become synonymous with the
"Devil " and "Hell. 11
Andersonville , located in southwestern Georgia and far from
the seat of war , had been selected as a prison site when it became
necessary to remove the prisoners from Richmond .
In December, 1863 ,
Captain Richard B. l'iinder was ordered to oversee the construction
of a stockade and to make ready for 1 0 , 000 prisoners. 9 Camp
Sumter at Andersonvi l le was to be the " gra n d receptacle" for enlisted men captured throughout the South; 1 0 officers Ivere to be
kept at Macon . ll
From the very beginning the officials in charge were confronted
with unalterable situations .
Before preparations were complete ,
officials were informed that prisoners would be arriving dai l y .
In the middle of February , 1864 , the first group arrived at the
unfinished stockade . 1 2 Hesseltine writes that "The officers in
charge of the prison cou l d do little more than to secure the
prisoners
"13
~Ihen Hirz arrived in April , he found prison conditions bad,
and in spite of the efforts he and others made, conditions grew
lvorse . The horrors of Andersonville have echoed throughout the
pages of h istory . Within four months , the sixteen and one- half
acre stockade was enlarged by ten acres , but overcrowding was
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only temporarily relieved as prisoners continued to arrive dail y
by the trainload. 14
Unbelievable discomfort was caused by lack of shelter as the
prisoners were exposed to rain, heat and cold.
There were no
barracks or tents, not even trees to offer protection since they
had been used in the construction of the stockade.
Improvised
shelters sprang up in a haphazard manner as prisoners covered the
severed tree branches and poles with old blankets, dirt or any thing
else that might afford the slightest protection. IS Exposure was
more intense as their clothes rotted away and their captors could
furnish them none.
The desperate prisoners frequently resorted to
fighting over the clothing of their dying comrades before their
bodies were taken to the dead house where the awaited burial was
simply a cover of earth and a numbered grave marker. 16
The only necessity provided for the prisoners was food--this
of poor quality and meager amounts.
From the beginning, the
Commissary General had insufficient funds for rations; and during
the final months, he received no government money at all .
Inadequate cooking facilities forced the prisoners to receive uncooked
rations intermittently; frequently, certain rations could not be
issued for lack of utensils . The corn meal, consisting of onesixth husk, caused much illness among the prisoners. The records
show that Wirz brought these deficiencies to the attention of his
superiors and urged them to relieve the situation. Little was ever
accomplished, however, and the subject of feeding the prisoners has,
to this day, remained a controversy . Confederate officials consistently maintained that the rations were the same as those issued
to Southern soldiers in the field.
The stockade stream was contaminated by the cookhouse refuse,
and the marsh land bordering the stream was turned into a three
and one-half acre swamp as thousands of men constantly milled about .
Inadequate sinks and poor sanitary habits led to latrine use of
the entire swamp. Not only was it uninhabitable, but it became a
breeding ground for disease. An unbearable stench rose from the
area and swept throughout the stockade. IS
wirz allowed the prisoners to dig wells for fresh water, even
at the risk of having them conceal tunnels in the process. He
tried desparately to reclaim the swamp and to improve the sanitary
conditions . The project, initially delayed by lack of tools, was
never completed because of the necessity of other work and the
continued arrival of other prisoners. 19
The frightful conditions turned the prison into a giant sick
bay. Although the hospital was eventually removed from inside the
filthy pen, facilities remained grossly inadequate.
The sick were
brought to the gates each morning to be examined. The haphazard
arrangement and overcrowded conditions made it impossible to visit
them in their quarters. More than ten times the number of doctors
present were needed;20 the patient-doctor ratio was two hundred to
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one . 21 Since only the worst cases could be admitted to the hospi tal, many seriously ill had to remain inside the stockade , and
medicine was brought to them.
On occasions in 1864, there were no
medicines at a ll. 22
Prisoners arriving from Richmond brought smallpox with them.
To prevent its spreading , 3000 prisoners were vaccinated . Many
of them, suffering from scurvy, died as the inflamed area deve l oped
an ulcer and gangrene set in.
The high ratio of deaths and anpu tations resulting from the vaccine caused the captives to accuse
the Confederates of using poison vaccine . 2 3 Although the duties
of Wirz did not include the hospital and care of the sick, he was
soon to pay for all the inadequacies of Andersonvi ll e Prison .
From first till last Andersonv ille held 45 , 000 prisoners , the
most at one time being about 32,000 . 24 Although the stockade had
been enlarged by ten acres, the capacity never exceeded 17,500 .
The deadline, that row of posts demarcating life and death, took
away at l east fifteen feet around the inside; and the swamp, about
three and one-half acres in the center , l eaving each man six square
feet of space. With the severe congestion, the debi l itated condition of the prisoners on arrival , improper diet , polluted water,
exposure to the elements , inadequate hospital facilities , and contageous disease , it is not surprisin g that 13,000 Union prisoners
died there.
Nearly 3000 died in the month of August , almost 1 00
a day .2 5 During t his month Wirz himself was very ill from over work and lac k of assistance , but he hesitated to take a leave since
there was no replacement for him. 26
The dep l orable conditions caused some of the inmates to lose
their sanity. Many became so dejected that they welcomed death .
They committed suicide or forced their captors to kill them by
crossing the dead lin e . The number of dea ths along the deadline
caused many p risoners to believe the rumor th at the guards received a thirty day furlough for each Yankee they kil led . 2 7
Others tried to escape the misery by tunneling out of the prison
or by running away from outside details .
A great number did
escape, but only 329 of the captives escaped permanent l y . The dogs
used by the Confede rates for hunting escapees a nd the d istan ce
from Union territory made most escape attempts unsuccessful. 28
Reca ptured prisone rs were punished by having to wear a ba ll
and chain for the remainder of their captivity.
Rations were withhe l d for missing morning roll call , and punishment for minor offenses
was two hours work . Contrary to the testimony of prisoners,
Confederate Inspector Wa lter Bowie said th a t "Captain ,'lirz, the
commander of the p rison, is ve r y firm and rigid in the disc i p line
of the prisoners, and a t the same time exercises toward them a ll
proper acts of kindness .,, 29 He helped make arrangements for six
prisoners to journey to Washing ton with a petition expressing the
demoralizing conditions at Andersonville and containing a p lea for
th e government intervention for paro le or exchange of p risoners.
Not hing ever came of the trip to ~Iashington. 30
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Since guards could not be spared to administer internal dis cipline, the majority of the prisoners fell victim to the Raiders,
a group of marauders from their own ranks who robbed and beat at
will. After hearing pleas from the prisoners , Hirz organized the
Regu lators, a police force from among the Union ca p tives, and
issued the order to withho ld rations until the culprits were
caught and pun ished.
General John Winder, the commander of the
post, approved wirz's plan.
The Union prisoners captured, tried,
and sentenced the Raiders.
Six were condemned to death by hanging.
Unfortunately this is the only deed that many prisoners
credit to Wirz.31
For most, he was their jailer, and his efforts against impossible odds remained invisible to them.
As the only Confederate officer in regular contact with the pr isoners, he became
the symbol of their misery and suffering.
They united in describing him as a brute. 32 The most vehemen t description comes from
John lVlcE lroy:
He was an undersized, fidgety man IIli th an insignificant
face, and a mouth that protruded like a rabbit's.
His
bright little eyes, like those of a squirrel or a rat,
assisted in giving his countenance a look of kinship to
the family of rodent animals--a genus which lives by
stealth and cunning, subsisting on that which it can
steal away from stronger and braver creatures.
He
was simply contemptabJ.e from whatever point of view he
was studied.
Gnatbrained, cOlilardly, and feeble-natured,
he was not a quality that commanded respect from any
one who knew him . 33
Others have IIlri tten that with his Rebel escort he rode through
the camp on an old gray horse brandishing his revol v er and shouting
obscenities in his broken English.
They called him the "Fly ing
Dutchman" and viewed him as a domineering and abusive brute, a
thoroughly evil man without a semblance of humanity.34 Hesseltine
writes that "Prisoners in confinement and in varying stages of
illness were in no position to make objective judgements. It was
easy for them to believe their jailers deliberately subjected
them to hardships."35
Contrary to the opinions of the prisoners is that of Confederate inspectors. Although they attest to the horrors at Andersonville, they unite in commend ing Wirz .
In Hay, Major Thomas P.
Turner wrote
I wish to add a word in relation to the officer commanding
the interior prison (the prison proper), Captain Wirz, who
in my opinion, deserves great credit for the good sense and
energy he has displayed in the management of the prison
at Andersonville.
He is the only man who seems to fully
comprehend his important duties.
He does the work of
commandant, adjutant, clerk, and warden, and without his
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presence at Camp Sumter at this time everything ,~ould be
chaos and confusion; in my opinion, at least two commissioned officers should be assigned to duty to assist
him. 36
In August , Wirz again was praised by a Confederate inspector,
Co l one l D. T. Chand l er:
"Capt . Henry vlirz.
. is entitled to
commendation for his untiring energy and devotion to the discharge
of the multifarious duties of his position , for which he is preeminentl y qualified . "37
In spite of these commendations of Wirz, the horrors of
Andersonvi lle cannot be denied.
In placing Andersonvil l e and wirz
in proper historical pe rs pective , several points must be considered . At the outbreak of the war neither side had had an organized prison system with a hierarchy of officers . Housing, a ration
system and medical care for lar ge numbers of captives were not in
the war p lans . Northern prisons eventually resulted from definite
p lan s and were administered by experienced officers. Lieutenant
Co lonel W. Hoffman was ear l y appointed Commissary General of
prisoners in the North and held the position throughout the war .
Southern prisons, on the other hand, developed to meet the exigencies of the moment , and not until 1 864 did the South appoint
General John Winder to a similar, but l ess well defined , position. 38
The best so lution had seemed to paro le the prisoners . J. G.
Randa ll and David Donald say that the "subject of the exchange of
prisoners .
. is at the heart of the p ro b lem and must be understood before any comment on the treatment of prisoners can be
a ttempted. "39 Early in the war, prison exchanges "ere handled
through individual commanders; but as the war dragged on with an
ever increasing number of captives, it was necessary to effect a
p lan of excha nge.
In July, 1862, arrangements were made for a
cartel:
even exchange prisoners were not t o be denied further
military activity, but the surplus captives who were paro led were
not to bear arms again. With the cartel the prisoner situation
was checked for awhile; however, several obstacles eventua ll y
caused the system of exchange under the cartel to collapse. From
1863 on, the numbe r of war prisoners cont inued to increase on both
sides. A few exchanges did continue to take p lace , and unsuccessful attempts were made to restore the cartel.
In April, 1 864 ,
Grant, believing that the militar y power of the South had to be
exhausted, ordered that all prison exchanges stop.40
Mi litar il y the policy of non-exchange was p robabl y correct,
The North had suff icient manpower, and those captured from their
ranks consumed Confederate supplies.
The Southern prisoners , once
released, would again make up the inadequate ranks of the Confederate army. 41 l~hile the policy of exchange see-sawed, myriads of
soldiers were taken captive and the pr ison rolls continually grew
in both North and South.
Captured and confined were approximately
195,000 Northerners and 215,000 Confederates. Of these, over
30,000 Union prisoners died (fifteen pe r cent) and nearly 26,000
Confederates (twel ve per cent).
Forty-b~o thousand of the Union
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captives were held at Andersonville, and nearly 13,000 of them
died there. 42
Hesseltine writes
Were the number of wounded prisoners known, or the number
of soldiers suffering from camp disease and battle fatigue at the time of their capture, the picture of suffering and death in prisons might become clearer. Certain
it is, that the prisoners sent to Andersonville were
weak and disease-ridden as a result of their long confinement on Belle Isle in the James River, and that many were
sick when they were captured. Most of the deaths in
Andersonville came in the months after the serious overcrowding had been relieved by sending all prisoners fit
to travel to other prisons.
In fact, the prison was, for
most of its existence, a vast poorly organized, and inadequate hospital. 43
At the end of the war the South was desparately trying to care
for hordes of prisoners.
The transportation and supply system had
collapsed; first rate officers could not be spared for prison duty
for they were needed at the front as the Union armies made the
final sweep across the South.
Union prisoners were not much
worse off than many of the soldiers of the Confederacy.
These
facts must be considered when judging the horrors at Andersonville.
Randall and Donald write that "The sickening story of Andersonville.
. is not to be set down, in the manner of lurid prison
literature, as a chapter in Confederate cruelty; it is the tragedy
of an impossible situation forced by the barbarity of war.,,44
Futch concedes that "war is hell" and that it cannot be denied
that the scarcity of Southern resources contributed to the suffering and death at Andersonville, but he strongly charges that "What
may be less obvious, though no less important, is that some of
it came as a result of short sighted management and lack of administrative ability. ,,45 He indicts the officers for locating the
bakery and cookhouse on the stream of drinking water, for placing
the hospital inside the stockade, and for failing to arrange the
make-shift dwellings of the prisoners in some order. 46 These were
mistakes, perhaps due to lack of foresight, but no one could have
had the foresight of Andersonville.
Wirz had not been responsible
for these decisions, but like the others, he fell short of the
tasks that were assigned him--tasks, however, that were humanly
impossible against the odds at Andersonville.
On the question of exchange, Futch argues from a moral viewpoint:
"The breakdown of exchange in no way relieved the South of
its obligations under the recognized rules of war to care properly
for prisoners. When a nation at war is no longer able to wage
war, it is duty-bound to give up the struggle.
"47 An opposing opinion is found in Page,".
the Federal authorities must
share the blame for these things Lthe horrors of Andersonvill~7
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'vi th the Confederates since they we l l knevl the inability of the
Confederates to meet the reasonable wants of their prisoners of
war, as they lacked a supply of their own needs , and since the
Pederal authorities failed to exercise a humane policy in the exchange of those captured in battle ." 48
As the evidence and historical interpretations are continually re-examined, U1e controversy is likely to continue.
There
seems to be no doubt among some that the real culprit was war-that the dreadful things that happen during war are the fault of
war itself rather than of individuals .
It is true that the lack
of a prison system and the mistaken judgment of officers in charge
contributed to the suffering at Andersonville, but their tasks
seem to have been impossible. Another truth is that the Northern
policy of non-exchange, militarily sound or not, contributed to
the deaths at Andersonville.
And in condemning the South for
treatment of prisoners of war, an important fact to remember is
that twelve per cent of the Southern soldiers confined in Northern
prisons also died.
The North, in spite of its capabilities and
resources , cared little better for its prisoners than did the South .
But when the end came, someone had to pay for the sins of ,var.
Although the leaders of the Confederacy and the whole South were
indicted, Henry Wirz, alone, was destined to atone for the sins of
Vlar, the sins (.If both North and South.
By the end of September, 1864, vlhen Sherman had Atlanta in
his grip, General Ivinder began moving the prisoners to other areas.
In October after the comoletion of a new prison in Nillen, Georgia,
the armament and equipment were taken from Andersonville, and all
Andersonville prisoners except those too ill to travel were removed . The advancing lines of Sherman soon forced the abandonment
of the Millen prison and caused the Confederacy to spend the last
months of 1864 and the early months of 1865 searching for a safe
place to keep their captives . Winder , weary of the search, recommended paroling those whose terms had expired.
Robert Ould , t.he
Southern officer in charge of exchange , was eventually successful
in arranging an exchange . 49
Prisoners, arriving in Savannah and Charleston , were met by
neVIs correspondents who sent stories of their suffering to their
home newspapers . The emanciated skeletons Vlere proof of the Rebel
cruelty . The hatred generated by the 'var made it possible for the
Northerners to believe that both the sadistic jailers and the
perfidious leaders of the Confederacy were to blame.
The Northern
officials retaliated against Southern prisoners for the alleged
cruelties perpetrated by t he Confederates . The psychosis engendered
by the war did not end with the union victory but ran rampant
lon g enough to bring about the mock trial and execution of Captain
Henry lVirz , the Andersonvi lle jailor.50
The war hysteria VIas intensified by Lincoln's assassination .
Rutman has written that if No rth ern victory had not bee n tarnished
by the assassination of Lincoln, the "rancor of wa r" might have
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vanished and Henry l'lirz might have gone home . He explains that
after the assassination of Lincoln, " Secretary of War Edwin rl.
Stanton assumed almost the role of a military dictator .
Stanton dec l ared to the world that Lincoln had been the victim of
a grea t conspiracy directed against the North by Jefferson Davis
and the Southern Confederacy. ,,51
1·lhen the attempts to implicate the Confederate officers in
the assassination of the President failed, Stanton pursued another
course.
He accused Davis and the Confederate leaders of conspiring to murder Federa l prisoners of war.
Rutman says , "It was in
the pursuit of this second course , rather than as a result of pub lic agitation, that a vindictive administration seized upon Henry
Wirz . ,,52 In acc u sing the Confederates, Stanton expected a l so to
take atten tion away from the Northern policy of non-exchange, a
policy which had caused much criticism in the North . 5 3
At the time of his arrest, Wirz had not become a " cause
celebre" in the North, but with his arrest and imprisonment in
Washington and the announcement of his trial, the press directed
the fury of the No rth upon him.
As the hatred and hysteria of
four years of war centered on this one man; Hirz the man died, and
Wirz the le gend was born . " 54
Wirz, exhausted and suffering from the pain in his arm , had
remained at Andersonville when the war was over . When Captain
Henry Noyes arrived in ~lay , he confiscated the prison records and
ordered wirz to accompany him to Genera l J. H. Wilson 's headquarters in l1acon.
Wirz and the prison documents were sent to
Washington , D. C.55 En route , fierce attacks were made on his life
by ex- prisoners.
In Louisville, he shaved away his beard and
moustache and donned the disguise of a black suit and beaver hat
to conceal him from the wrath of his enemies. 56 On l1ay 10 , 1865,
Wirz was confined in the Old Capitol Prison, and for three months
he languished there while the I'lar Department gathered evidence
against him and the radical segment of the Northern press depicted
h i m as the world 's greatest criminal. Under the direction of
Stanton, Colonel Norton P. Chipman located and interviewed numerous eye witnesses.
His apparent purpose was to prepare a case to
prove a general conspiracy among the Confederates and to prove
specific charges of atrocities against Wirz.
He would, thus,
satisfy Stanton and the vindictives and the furious public . 57
A mi l itary commission met on August 21, 1865, in the Court
of Claims ' Hall to arraign vlirz for the Andersonville crimes .
When Stanton read the first charge-- a conspiracy charge much like
that of the Lincoln trial- - he became enraged and dismissed the
court.
Wirz was accused of conspiring with Davis and other high
ranking officials to murder prisoners.
Stanton had been embar rassed by the Lincoln conspiracy charge and did not want to suffer
the same again. 58
The military commission next met on Wednesday, August 23, to
begin the trial of Henry Wirz anew . The most important members of
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charges and specifications against Wirz were read, the names of
Davis and certain others had been deleted . Charge I accused lhrz
of conspiring with other Rebel leaders to "maliciously, wil fully , and traitorously .
. injure the health and destroy the
lives of Federal soldiers then being held as prisoners of war . "
The charge maintained that he willfully neglected to furnish shel ter , adequate food, wood for cooking, necessary medicine and medical attendance, and clean water, and that he inflicted cruel ,
unusual and infamous punishment on the prisoners .
He was further
charged with vaccinating them with poison vaccine . 5 9
Under Charge I I lVirz was accused of murder , in violation of
the laws and customs of war . This charge included thirteen specifications of murder . wirz allegedly shot three men himself,
ordered the guards to kill four others , beat to death two prisoners , allowed the dogs to ki ll o ne, left two to die in the stocks
and one in the chain gang . Two of these prisoners lived one day,
two lived five days, and one lived ten days after his punishment
had been inflicted . Yet , not one victim's name could be given . 60
When wirz was called on to immediately enter a plea , James
Hughes and Charles Peck withdrew as counselors for the accused.
With tears in his eyes , Wirz expressed his regret to Peck who
assured him that he would be better off "in the hands of the Judge Advocate than if defended by special counsel .
"(~hey had
only been informed at eight o ' clock that the court would reconvene
that day . ) \'Jallace announced that the judge - advocate Ivas by law
the attorney for the defendant and adjourned the trial to give him
time to prepare a case;61 however , when the trial began the following day, Louis Schade , a fellow countryman of \Virz, and o. S .
Baker were permitted to appear as counsel for \,yirz . 62
After the specifications were read , the counsel for the
accused entered Wirz ' s plea which contained five major points :
\hrz was protected under the Johnson-SherMan agreement of surrender; Captain Noyes violated his promise that wirz would not be
arrested and that he would have safe conduct to his home; the
military conunission had no jurisdiction to try him; the charges
and specifications should be dropped because they were so vague
and indefinite and because he was not gui lty of any offense punishable under the laws of war; and that he had been arraigned on
identical charges on August 21 , and could not be brought before
the court again . 63
The judge-advocate then entered into a lengthy discussion of
the p leas submitted by Wirz and his counsel.
Chipman said the
court had already decided the issue of the charges and specifications and that the question of military jurisdiction was to be
argued at a later date . Concerning the question of "double-jeopardy , " Chipman read a letter from Judge Advocate General Holt
which stated that a person could be put in double jeopardy only if
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a formal acqui tta l or conviction was passed by the fi rs t court .
"A withdrawa l of any charge may be made by the judge - advocate, wi th
the assent of the court ; and upon such charge , if the interests
of public justice require it , the par t y may be aga in arraigned . "
This was the ca se of Wirz , he claimed. The fourth poi nt concerned
the promise of safe conduct g i ven to Wirz by Captain Noyes . Chipman
said that it was simply a vio l ation of an agreement between Wirz
and Noyes and had nothing to do wi th t he military commis sion .
Finally, Chipman argued that the Johnson - Sherman ag reement was not
a general amnesty or pa rdon. This agreement did not absolve Wirz
from the crimes he committed in vio l a tion of the laws of war.
After the judge- advoca te concluded his a r g ument s , the court was
cleared fo r deliberation.
It vIas announc ed that the cou rt sustai ned
the mo ti on of the judge-advocate and over rul ed the p leas of Ivirz .
I-lirz p leaded not gui lty to each of the charges and specif ications . 64
The testimony of the tri a l then commenced and lasted for
sixty - three days , ending on October 24, 1865 . During the trial
the p ress continuall y demonstrated its prejudice thro ugh the descriptions of Wirz:
Ye t the central f igure in the room i s after a ll , thi s
Swiss-American, Henr y Wir z , whom God p ro bab l y made , and
yet whom no man thinks of as a brothe r.
Is there fami l y
relationship among fiends? Let us be thank f ul tha t this
one can claim neither American birth o r education .
There isn't much of the original v illain in his appearance,
though he looks like a man utter l y wi th out conscience and
r eady t o do , for a consideration, almost any infernal deed
set for him by a superior . 65
The trial was temporar ily adjourned in September when Wirz became
ill.
The press reported that his illness was severe ne r vous n ess ,
which increased each time some new accusation against him surfaced.
When the trial resumed several days later, \·lir z was compel led by
weakness to lie o n a sofa during the trial proceedings. o6
During the course of the t wo - mon th trial, 48 witnesses testif ied. As witness after wi tness t ook the stand, a resume of the
horrors at Andersonville Prison wa s p resented . ~\ost of the wi tnesses for the prosec ution testi f ied to the evi l side of Wir z ' s
nature, b ut only a dozen or so claimed to have seen him kill pris oners.
These wi tnesses could contribute the most minute detai l s
of th e murders , everythi n g but the victims ' names, in spite of the
fac t that some of them lin ger ed for several day s . 67
The judge-advocate a lon e had the pmler to summon \vi tnesses,
a nd he re fused to issue subpoenas to anyone who cou l d testify to
similar conditions in Nor thern prisons . Some ver y impo r tant wit nes ses for the defense we re not al l owed to testify. Chipman
exc luded or hurri ed over t e st imony concern ing efforts to improve
prison conditions and labored over horrible condition s at Ander sonville and the evil character of Wirz . 68
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Th e prosec uti on had some o ut stan di n g wi tn esses who c o n tri bu t ed vi t a l testimon y . On e p r omi nent witn ess was Feli x de J. a
Ba ume, who c l aimed t o have wi tnessed c rue l ti es c ommitted by Ih r z .
On his fi r s t day a t t he p r ison, h e c l a i med t o h ave s e en Wi r z shoo t
t wo men, o n e of whom l a t er di e d .
He a l so saw a ma n d i e in th e
stocks a n d one k illed whi l e reach i n g under the dead l i ne. Most of
h is incr imina tin g t esti mony cente r ed on Wirz, n ot the p r i s o n condi tions. 69 De l a Baume t e stified that he was the g rand n eph ew of
Lafayette , thus c a tch ing the trust of eve r y on e . On No v e mb er 21,
e leven day s a f ,t e r the execution of lVirz, he was recognized by
some German s o ldiers in Washington as a d eserter from the Se v enth
Ne w York Volunteers.
His real name was Felix Oeser. 70
Another in f luential witness fo r the p ro s ecution was Geo r g e w.
Gray .
Gra y testifi e d that Wirz kill ed his comp anion, William
Stewart , for no reason , as they c a rried a body to t h e dead house .
This accusati o n pro voked an outburst from Wirz which the newspapers p ortrayed as a sign of his guilt.
Later, in his closing
statement , wirz said that there was no such person as William
Stewart. He was found only in the imagination of Gray .
His n a me
could not be found on any of the books of Andersonv ille prison,
and no other witness had ever heard o f him . 7l
The testimony of Confederates who were called by the prosecution corroborated the horrors at Andersonville but exonerated
Wirz from blame . A major piece of evidence was the D. T . Chandler
report which contained descriptions of the wretched conditions
in the stockade and hospital and denunciations of the officers
at the post, all except Wirz.
(Chandler ' s praise of Wirz has b e en
cited earlier.)
During the trial he gave the following testimony
which was not praise, yet it was not incriminating.
Facts have come to my k n ow l edge in relation to Captain
Wirz of which I had no suspicion at the time I recommended
him as an efficient officer .
He seemed to me to be energetic and industrious and attended to his duties, and I
neither saw nor heard anything to indicate cruel treatment
of the prisoners on his part, and I made some inq uiries
about it.
I will explain to the court.
I have been a
prisoner myse l f , and I know the unwillingness of prisoners
to make complaints in the presence of those who have
power over them, and for that reason, I took the men aside
and questioned them so that Wirz could not hear me as to
any complaints against him . The complaints were mostly of
insufficient food, of want of shelter, and of clothing;
no complaints were made about him to me . 72
An Andersonville surgeon , Dr . John C. Bates, and Confederate
officer, Lieutenant Colonel Alexander Persons , also testified to
the horrible conditions in the stockade and hospital but said
Captain vlirz was not resp onsible for the terrible conditions , that
he had nothing to do with the location of the stockade, the overcrowded conditions or the lack of she lter.
(In his final statement,
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Wirz used the testimony of t hese b/o and that of Chand l er as
s t a t ements of fact that he was not responsib l e for the horrible
con ditions at Andersonville . ) 73
Two clergymen associated with Andersonville testified the
same as Bates , Persons and Chandler. They described the prison
as a crowded, filthy stockade fu l l of suffering and dying men who
were covered with vermin; but they, too , characterized Wirz as a
kind individual who offered any assistance that he cou l d. There
were no restric t ions on what he allowed to be taken into the
s t ockade-- money , c l othing , or other items; lVirz had seemed anxious
to have care and attention given to the prisoners. 74
As the trial came to an end, Wirz again found himself without counsel . They had \vi thdravTn ",hen Chipman refused to give
them adequate time to prepare their closing statement. Wirz
stated his own defense in a l etter which was read to the court.
I n a n swering t he conspiracy charge , he pointed out that not one
witness had testified to such a conspiracy and that
if no living witness could be found to lend even the
weakest support to the monstrous supposition, surely
if it was not all a myth , a dream of the imagination
there could be found
. some scrap of documentary
evidence , to give it at l east the semblance of probability.75
On Charge I, he continued by arguing that
Those co consparitors /sic7 were all in the custody .
of the government; yet-not one of them was called upon
to take his place beside me and answer to this question
for his crime;
. they have all been favored with
clemency a n d their names have been expunged from the
charge. 76
(At this point, lVirz cited the testimony of Chandler , Bates, and
Persons to show that he was not responsible for the privations
and sufferings at Andersonville . ) 77
Concerning Charge II, Wirz stated that only two of the cases
of murder that he was charged with had any definiteness: the
case of William Stewart and Chickamauga . As stated earl ier,
Stewart was a fictional character who could be found on no prison record, only in Gray ' s mind.
Chickamauga, however, was a
rea l prisoner at Andersonvil l e.
His murder was recounted by at
least twenty witnesses , each with a different story.78
wirz recounted the incident, stating that Chickamau ga was
creating a disturbance, so Wirz himself was called into the stockade. I,hen the prisoner said that he wanted to be killed, Wirz
replied that he would oblige and drew his pistol. The prisoner
became frightened and went outside the deadline. Before leaving ,
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wirz said he tried to scare the prisone r fur t her by telling the
guard to shoot him if he crossed the deadline . When the Captain
left, Chickamauga we nt ba ck across the dead line and was shot by
the guard . 79
Throu ghout the trial much testimon y had centered on the
a ttacks of fe r ocious dogs.
(Specification elev en con cerned the
murder of a pr isoner by the dogs . ) wi rz said th at he was connected with only one such case--a man named Frenchy who repeatedly
escaped.
On one escape, Frenchy had fallen from a tree and wa s
attacked by the dogs.
Wirz reported that he had driven the dogs
off and that the man s uffered only br uise s and scratches.
He was
exchanged whe n the first opportunity came . BO
Wirz had thus answered the murder charges.
Other points he
made in his defense were that he wa s not awa re that the means of
p unishment at Andersonville were "unusual or cruel," that rations
were stopped for one day because of the confusion of the Raiders
and that rations were the same as those for Confederate soldiers,
that the condition of his arm would have p revented his beating or
attacking the prisoners , and that the va ccine charge was as un reasonable as to make him responsible for unskillful amputations
or improp er doses of medicine . He concluded his case with the
following p leas :
"May God so direct and enlighten you in your
deliberation that your reputation for impartiality and justice
may be upheld , my character vindicated, and the few days of my
natural life spared to my helpless family ." BI
When the judge-advocate proceeded to close the case, he began with a lengthy discussion of the jurisdiction of the court .
He said the President had the constitutional authority to establish the military court to try military crimes and argued that
the prisoner before the court was accused of crimes unknown to
civil law--crimes which were in violation of wa r.
He said wirz
wa s a belligerent acting in his own territory on the o r ders of
his superiors and concluded that the war was not over , that there
was still the threat of public danger . B2
Chipman next discussed the horrible conditions at Andersonville, giving a detai l ed and passionate account of the conspiracy
and the sadistic means of achieving its end . After accusing the
Confederates of selecting a site that would reap a large portion
of deaths, he cited the testimon y of specific individuals . B3
Ambrose Spencer, a Unionist from Andersonville, had testi fied
earlier that he once overheard General John l'linder say , "I am going
to build a pen here that will ki ll more damned Yankees than can
be destroyed in the front."B4
In connection with Charge II,
Chipman examined the cruelties of the dogs , the stocks , the deadline, the chain gang , and the stopping of rations . aS
Ih th this, the judge-advocate closed his case, and the court
was cleared for deliberation. Upon reconvening they announced
that they had found the acc used, Henry Wirz , guilty of the speci fications to Charge I after rewo r din g it to read as follows:
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The said Henry Wirz, did combine, confederate and conspire
with them, the said Jefferson Davis, James A. Seddon,
and others whose names are unknown.
. who we re then
engaged in armed rebellion against the United States,
maliciously, traitorously , and in violation of the laws
of war, to impair and injure the health and to destroy
the lives by subjecting to torture and great suffering
. . . large numbers of federal prisoners.
. held .
at Andersonville. 86
In light of the evidence, the commission had re-entered the names
of Davis and others.
Wirz was then p ronounced guilty of Charge II. The dates in
the specifications of murder had been changed to agree with the
testimony of the witnesses, one date having been changed from
June to September. Wi rz had been on sic k leave in Au gust when
some of the victims were supposedly killed by him. 87 Throughout
the trial there was no evidence to show that such a conspiracy had
existed, nor was there any proof that Hirz had ever murdered any
one at Andersonville; to this day such proof has not been p resented. 88
The court sentenced him to be hanged , and on Novembe r 3, 1865,
President Johnson sealed the fate of Henry Wi rz when he signed a n
order that the execution of Wirz be carried out on Friday, Novembe r
10, 1865, between the hours of six o'clock A. M. and twelve
o'clock noon. 89
On November 10, the crowd began arriving early for the pub lic
execution.
Two hundred spectators hel d tickets for positions inside the courtyard .
(There had been re q uests for a thousand.)
The rest pe rched in the tops of trees or on houseto p s; some even
sat atop the Capitol dome a quar ter-mile away. The Union officers
arrived at ten o'clock to take the Captain to the prison ya rd.
They tried to pinion his arms behind his back, but the handcuffs
would not slip from his- swollen ri gh t arm. Dressed in a black
shroud, I'lirz made his way to the courtyard, approached the scaffold, and mounted the steps with a dignity that disappointed those
who expected to see a cringing coward in the face of dea th. The
order was read stating the findings of the court, the condemned
man was given the last rites of the Catholic church, and the noose
was adjusted around his neck as the crowd, mostly soldiers, shouted,
"Hang him."
" Anderson v ille."
" Remember Andersonville." At
exactly ten thirty, the death spring was released, and the infamous Andersonville commandant fell to his death. 90 with atonement made for the sins of wa r, Hirz ,vas laid to rest in a grave
site admist the Lincoln conspirators. 9l
Stories had continued to circulate to the bitter end. The
night before hi s execution, the No rthern p ress was informed that
wirz had made a statement imp lica ting Jefferson Davis and that the
p ublic would soon hear the confession. This last desperate a ttemp t
to connect Davis with the atrocities at Andersonville failed.
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Father Boyle, Wi rz' s priest , and Louis Schade , his lawyer, both
claimed that Wirz was offered a pardon if he would implicate Davis
but that he refused, saying he knew nothing of President Davis.
Jefferson Davis and the others who had been imprisoned were never
brought to tri al , and with the exception of Davis, all we re soon
released. 92
A second incident, which was supposed to have occurred some
weeks earlier, was related the day after his death.
The p rison
guard claimed to have prevented Wirz from being killed b y his wife
when she tried to pass a capsule of poison to him as they kissed.
The story does not reveal her moti ves--if she wanted to kill her
"monstrous" husband or if she attempted to cheat the p ublic of its
reven ge by aiding him in a su i cide.
The guard ' s story as it
appeared in the New York Times has the q uality of a sensational
novel. The story was obviously circulated to weaken the noble
manner in which wirz faced death and to further blacken his
character. 93
To his death wirz claimed his innocence . He left behind a
statement and a wish : "11y life is demanded as atonement.
I am
willing to give it , and I hope that after avlhile I will be judged
differently from what I am now . ,,94 The people in the South knew
very little of wirz during the time he was commandant at Andersonville, but subsequ ent developments called them to defend his name.
Through hTirz , the entire South had been defamed; so through his
defe n se, Southern honor would be restored . 95
In 1905 when a Georgia Chapter of the United Daughters of the
Confederacy decided to erect a monument honoring hTirz, a bitter
controversy raged across the country , preventing the monument from
being placed at Andersonville.
Feder al authorities refused to
have the monument placed inside either Andersonville National
Cemetery or the Prison Park . The officia ls agreed to remove derogatory signs concerning the Confederacy and the South but the women
responsible for the monument r emained adamant, and the memorial
to Wirz was unvei l ed by his dau ghter on May 12 , 1909, in the
village of Andersonville. 96
The controversial monumen t sti l l stands in the center of the
tiny Civil War town, just a few yards from the rails that brought
13 , 000 men to their death.
In 19 1 9 it was defaced with paint ,
but within a day all the paint had been cleaned away.
In 1958 the
Georgia Legislature defeated a bill that ca l led for repairing and
clea n ing the monument . The leading opponent was Representative
U. S . Lancaster , the nephew of an Andersonville guard.
Lancaster
claimed that the Confederate guards at the prison hated Ihrz. 97
Although the abuses of time have threatened the inscriptions ,
the passages are still visible . The inscriptions present a
defense of Henry vlirz and Andersonville :
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Front Side
In memory of Captain Henry Wirz, C. S. A. Born
Zurich, Switzerland, 1822. Sentenced to death and executed at Washington, D. C., Nov. 10, 1865.
.
To rescue his name from the stigma attached to it
by embittered prejudice, this shaft is erected by the
Georgia Division, United Daughters of the Confederacy.
Second Side
Discharging his duty with such humanity as the
harsh circumstances of the times, and the policy of the
foe permitted, Captain Wirz became at last the victim
of misdirected popular clamor.
He was arrested in time of peace, while under the
protection of a parole, tried by a military commission
of a service to which he did not belong and condemned to
ignominious death on charges of excessive cruelty to
Federal prisoners.
He indignantly spurned a pardon,
proffered on condition that he would incriminate President
Davis and thus exonerate himself from charges of which both
were innocent.
Third Side
It is hard on our men held in Southern prisons not
to exchange them, but it is humanity to those left in the
ranks to fight our battles. At this particular time to
release all rebel prisoners North, would insure Sherman's
defeat and would compromise our safety here.
August 18, 1864
Ulysses S. Grant
Fourth Side
When time shall have softened passion and prejudice,
when reason shall have stripped the mask of misrepresentation, then justice, holding even her scales, will require
much of past censure and praise to change places.
December, 1888
Jefferson Davis 98
Chipman, enraged by the dedication of the monument, published
a more detailed account of the evidence concerning the Wirz trial.
He claimed that the Daughters of the Confederacy were challenging
the proceedings of the trial and denouncing the witnesses, that
they were declaring the responsibility of the Federal government
for the suffering at Andersonville, and that they were proclaimint Wirz a martyr. 99
A long while has passed, and the judgment of Wirz is still
being challenged.
Historians agree that Andersonville was the
result of a crippled Confederacy and that war causes horrible
things to happen; however, they differ in their indictment of
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Henry Wirz. Although no one seriously believes that there ever
was a conspiracy or that there is any evidence to sustain the
murder charges against Wirz , some still view him as a fiendish
creature who was justly punished . They condemn him because he had
an ill nature, a harsh tongue, and a threatening manner, and
because many prisoners have left records of their hatred of him.
The testimony of his Confederate superiors is disregarded; disregarded, too, is the fact that to secure the prisoners and to
discipline them was his job. But we ll remembered is that he
fa iled to maintain the stockade facilities in a satisfactory manner.
That he tried against insurmountable odds counts for little;
obviously, the task would have required an administrative genius.
It is not ironic justice that Henry Wirz was the last victim of
Andersonville; rather, the story of Henry Wirz is the tragedy of
a man rushed to an untimely death as the passions of war demanded
a scapegoat.

19
NOTES
lOvid L. Futch, History of Andersonville Prison (Indian Town,
Fla., 1968), 16; James Madison Page, The True Story of Andersonvi lle Prison: A Defense of Major Henry Wirz (New York , 1908),
183; Darrett B. Rutman , "The War Crimes and Trial of Henry Wirz,"
Civil War History, VI (June 1960), 118; Robert E. and Katharine M.
Morseberger, "After Andersonville: The First \'lar Crimes Trial,"
Civil War Times Illustrated, XIII (July 1974), 35.
2Futch, History of Andersonville , 16.
3Ibid., 16; Page, True Story of Andersonville, 183; Rutman,
"War Crimes," 118.
4Futch, History of Andersonville, 16.
5page, True Story of Andersonville, 183-184; Futch, History
of Andersonville , 16; Ambrose Spencer, A Narrative of Anderson vi lle Drawn from the Evidence Elicited on the Trial of Henry
Wirz, the Jailer. With the Argument of Col. N. P. Chipman, Judge
Advocate (New York, 1866), 55 56.
6page, True Story of Andersonville, 185; Rutman , "War Crimes,"
118; Futch, History of Andersonville, 16. After Wirz's arrest,
the New York Times, Aug. 8, 1865, reported that Dr. Caspari had
dismissed Wirz because he was dishonest. He was described as a
"fawning, cringing, 'Uri ah Heap' sort of fellow.
"
7Futch, History of Andersonvi lle, 17; Rutman, "War Crimes,"
118.

8Rutman, "War Crimes," 118-119; Page, True Story of Anderson ville, 185-186; The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the
Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies (128 vols .,
Washington, 1880-1901), Series II, Vol . VIII, 537; VII , 169.
Hereafter cited as OR., and unless specified, all references are
to Series II.
-90R., VIII, 730.
100R., VII , 167.
llWilliam Best Hesseltine, Civil War Prisons:
Psychology (Columbus, Ohio, 1930), 146.
120R., VIII, 731.
l3Hesseltine, Civil War Prisons, 147.
l4page, True Story of Andersonville, 99.
l50R., VII, 120, 136, 525, 547.

A Study in War

20
161Villiam H. Allen , "One Hundred and Ninety Days in Rebel
Prisons ," Annals of Iowa , XXXVIII (winter 1966), 234; John L .
Ransom , John Ransom ' s Diary (New York , 1963; first published
1881), 68 ; New York Times, Aug . 25, 1865; OR. , VII , 547; Milton
E. Flower , ed . , Dear Folks at Home: The CIVil loJar Letters of Leo
W. and John I . Faller with an Account of Andersonville (Carlisle,
Penn ., 1963), 123 .
170R., VII , 138, 170, 207, 473, 525 , 547 , 733, 759.
180R., VIII, 733; VII , 136, 522; Helleltine, Civil War Prisons , 146.
190R. , VII , 120, 136, 167, 170, 521, 547.
20Ibid., 547 , 759 - 760.
21Futch, History of Andersonville, 97.
220R., VII, 547, 758; Ransom, Diary , 59.
230R., VII , 758; Futch , History of Andersonville , 98 .
24Horseberger, " After Andersonville ," 39.
25Rutman, "War Crimes ," 11 9 ; Hesseltine , Civil War Prisons, 146 ,
152; OR ., VII , 1 36 , 170-171, 525.
260R ., VII , 589 .
27 page , True Story of Andersonville , 91.
28Futch, Historv of Andersonville, 49-50.
29 0 R ., VII , 136-137.
30Page , True Story of Andersonville , 127-130.
31Futch, History of Andersonville , 63 , 68-74 ; Hesseltine, civil
War Pr i sons , 144-145; Ransom , Diary, 105, 107. See also Page , True
Story of Andersonville , 110-121; Warren Lee Goss , The Soldier ' s
Story of His Captivity at Andersonvi lle , Belle Isle and Other Rebel
Prisons (Boston, 1868), 150-158; S . M. Dufur, Over the Dead Line , or
Tracked by Blood-Hounds (Burlington, Vt . , 1902), 91-95,101-103.
32Rutman , "War Crimes , " 119-120; Hesseltine , Civil War Prisons,
140.
33John McElroy, edited by Philip Van Doren Stern , Andersonville:
A Story of Rebel Military Prisons (Greenwich, Conn ., 1962 ; first
published 1879), 34 35 .

21
34New York Times , Aug. 8 , 1865; TIansom, Diary , 58, 76 , 92 ,
171-172; Allen , "One Hundred and Ni nety Day s, " 233 ; Goss , Soldier ' s
Story , 71; Dufur , Over the Dead Line, 90.
35Williarn Best Hesseltine, " Introduction," Wi llian Best
Hesse l tine , ed ., Civil War Prisons (Kent , Ohio , 1962), 7.
360R., VII , 1 68 . A similar report had been submit t ed earlier
in Ma yby Inspector ~lalter Bowie . See also OR., VII, 139.
37 Ib id., 551.
Chand l er , a Union sympathizer, condemned Genera l
Winder and spoke candidl y of conditions at Andersonville in the
same report.
38Hesseltine, Civil War Prisons, ix, 34-35; John S. Blay , The
civi l War: A Pictorial Profile (New York, 1 958) , 189, 191.
39 J . G. Randall and Dav id Dona l d, Ci v il \'lar and Reconstruction
(Lexington , Mass ., 1 969) , 337 .
40Ibid ., 334 - 335; Blay, Civil War , 189.
41Rutman, " War Crimes ," 1 20.
42He s seltine, "Introduction ," 6; Randall and Donald, Civil
War , 336 - 337 ; Blay, Civi l Ii'ar, 1 89 .
The estimates are based on
t he research of Adju t ant General F. C. Ainsworth and historian
James F . Rhodes . The following are pertinent statistics relatin g
t o Union deaths:
360 ,000 Uni on so l diers died dur ing the war;
11 0,000 as the result of battle (67,000 were killed in action
and 43,000 per i shed from wounds); 224,000 died of disease and the
rest ( 36 ,0 00) l ost their l ives to other causes--accidental death ,
suic i de , execu tion, and prison camps . A shocking fact is that 62
percent of the union deaths came from disease . See Blay , civ il
War, 230 .
43Hesseltine, "Introduction,"

6.

44 Randall and Donald, Civil War, 336 - 337 .
45Futch, History of Anderson vi lle, 1 2 .
46Ibid. , 17-18.
47Ibid., 118-119.
48Page , True Story of Andersonvi lle , 12.
49Hesseltine , Ci vil \'jar Prisons, 154, 156-158.
50Ib
'd. ,
__
1._

"
Vl1,

228 - 229 ; Futch , Histo ry of Andersonville, 116.

51Rutman, " War Crimes ," 120-121.
See also " Louis Scha de to
the American Public ," Washing ton D. C . / unidentified news p a p er/ ,
Ap ril 4 , 1 876 , cited in Page, True Story of Andersonvil l e, 236.

22
52Rutman, "War Crimes," 121.
OR., Series III, V, 149.

See also "Schade's Letter," 235;

53Rutman, "\~ar Crimes," 121.
54Ibid.
55page, True Story of Andersonville, 187-188; OR ., Series I ,
XLIX, Pt . II, 800; The Trial of Henry Wirz, 40 Cong., 2 Sess .,
House Executive Document 23 (Serial 1331),19-20. Hereafter cited
as Wirz Trial.
56Morseberger, "After Andersonville," 31; New York Times,
Aug . 8, 1865; wirz Trial , 20.
57Page , True Story of Andersonville, 188, 206; Rutman, "War
Crimes," 122; Morseberger, "After Andersonville," 32; New York
Times, Aug . 4, 1865.
58New York Times, Aug . 22-24 , 1865; Hesseltine , Civil War
Prisons, 240; Morseberger, " After Andersonville, " 23; Rutman ,
" War Crimes," 124.
59Wirz Trial, 2-5 .
60Ibid. , 5-8.
61 New York Times, Aug . 24, 1865 .
62Wi rz Trial , 9.
63Ibid. , 9-11.
64Ibid . , 12 - 16.
65 New York Times, Aug . 25, 1865 .
66Ibid., Sept. 14, 20, 1865; l'7irz Trial, 306 - 308 .
67Wirz Tri a l, 809 .

See also 67, 142, 146, 175 , 243 , 263.

68Rutman, " War Crimes,"

125-126.

69 Wirz Trial, 282-287 .
70page , True Story of .l\ndersonville , 205 - 206; Rutman, "War
Crimes ," 1 28-129 .
In preparing the trial record for pub lication,
Chipman omitted this kind of information .
71Wirz Trial, 398-399 , 713; "Schade ' s Letter ,"
72Wirz Trial, 241-242 .

239.

23
73rbid., 99-104, 706-709.
7 4rbid., 287-294, 706-709.
75rbid., 702-704.
76rbid., 705.
77rbid., 706-709.
78 r bid., 710-712.

See pages 135, 162, 184, 190, 253.

79rbid., 71l.
80 r bid. , 715-716.
8l r bid., 717-718, 720-721.
82rbid., 723-730. wirz might have had a better chance of
acquittal with a civil court .
That he was denied this protection
shows the " vindictive nature of the whole proceeding ." See Randall
and Donald, Civil War, 644.
83Wirz Trial, 731-782.
84rbid., 359. General Winder had died in February , 1865, and
thus escaped the wrath of the public.
85rbid., 782-803.
86rbid., 805.
87 r bid., 807-808, 847.
88"Schade's Letter,"

237; Futch, History of Andersonvi lle, 120.

89Wirz Trial, 808, 814 .
90New York Times, Nov. 11, 1865.
9lpage, True Story of Andersonville, 1 84 ; "Schade's Letter,"
242.
92"Schade's Letter," 237-239; Randa ll and Donald, Civi l War ,
335-336; Page, True Story of Andersonvi lle, 229; Sarah Ashe , The
Trial of Henr wirz with Other Matter Pertain ina Thereto (Raleigh,
1908 , 24.
93New York Times, Nov . 11, 1865; "Schade's Letter,"
94New York Times, Nov. 11, 1865.
95page, True Story of Anderson vi lle, 230.

238.

24

96peggy Sheppard, Andersonvi lle Georgia USA (Leslie, Ga. ,
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CRITICAL ESSAY ON SOURCES
The most valuable primary source for a study of Andersonville
Prison· and Henry Wirz is The War of the Rebellion : A Compilation
of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, 128
vols.
(Washington, 1880-1901) . Contained within the series is an
eight volume set dealing with prisons and prisoners . Host of the
information concerning the Andersonville period is found in vol umes VI, VII , VIII.
The material consists of the reports of inspectors and the reports and correspondence of prison officials.
A second major source, The Trial of Henry Wirz, 40 Cong . , 2
Sess., House Executive Document 23 (Serial 1331), presents the
trial testimony and an account of the trial proceedings.
In using
the testimony, extreme caution is necessary, for the reliability
of the witnesses is questionable.
The real value lies inthe support it gives in reconstructing the prejudiced atmosphere surrounding the ~virz trial . Further evidence concerning the prevailing
prejudice is found in the New York Times, Jan. -- Nov. 1865.
Two primary accounts holding wirz directly responsible for
Andersonville are Ambrose Spencer, A Narrative of Andersonville
Drawn from the Evidence Elicited on the Trial of Henry wirz, the
Jailer. With the Argument of Colonel N. P. Chipman, Judge-Advocate
(New York, 1866) and Norton P. Chipman, The Tragedy of Andersonville:
Trial of Captain Henry Wirz--the Prison Keeper (San Francisco, 1911).
The accounts of prisoners contribute much to an understanding
of the situation at Andersonville; however, most of them are
bitterly partisan accounts and must be read critically. John
McElroy , Andersonville: A Story of Rebel Military Prisons (Greenwich, Conn., 1962; first published 1879) is a modern abridgment by
Philip Van Doren Stern. McElroy chronicles the agony suffered at
Andersonville and depicts Wirz as the leading villain. John L.
Ransom, John Ransom's Diary (New York, 1963 ; first published 1881)
is evidence of the psychological strain the prisoners suffered.
A careful reading reveals the developing psychosis of Ransom as
he becomes more and more critical of Wirz.
Other prisoner accounts are William H. Allen, "One Hundred
and Ninety Days in Rebel Prisons," Annals of Iowa, XXXVIII (winter
1966), 222 - 38; s. M. Dufur, Over the Dead-Line, or Tracked by
Blood-Hounds (Burlington, Vt . , 1902); Milton E. Flower, ed., Dear
Folks at Home: The Civil War Letters of Leo W. and John I. Farrer,
with an Account of Andersonville (Carlisle, Penn., 1963); Warren
L . Goss , The Soldier ' s Story of His Captivity at Andersonville,
Belle Isle and Other Rebel Prisons (Boston, 1868) .
In contrast to the preceeding works is James Madison Page,
The True Story of Andersonville Prison: A Defense of Major Henry
Wirz (New York, 1908) . Page, a former prisoner of Andersonville ,
portrays vlirz as a kind individual and defends him against the
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negative accounts.
He includes "Schade to the American Public,"
a most important source written b y Wirz ' s attorne y . Another defense of Wirz published in the same year is Sarah W. Ashe,
Trial and Death of Henry Wirz, with Other Matters Pertaining
Thereto (Raleigh, 190 8) .

,

The two best secondary sources of Andersonville and Wirz
are Ovid L. Futch, History of Andersonville Prison (Indian Town,
Fla., 1969) and William Best Hesseltine, Civil War Prisons : A
Stud y in War Psychology (Columbus , Ohio , 1930) . The work by Futch
is an extensive history which attempts to explain vlhat happened
at Andersonville and why it happened. Although gene r al l y objec tive , his attitude toward wirz is obviously colored by the prejudice
found in prisoner accounts . He records that wirz was neither
guilty of the conspiracy charge nor the murder charges, yet his
description leaves wirz standing as one deserving of punishment.
Hesseltine's underlying theory is that the dreadful things that
happen during war are not the fault of individuals, but war itself . Andersonville , like the other prisons , was such a tragedy;
and Wirz was a victim of the psychosis that comes with \var. Another
source dealing with the same subject is the introduction to William
Best Hesseltine, ed., Civil War Prisons (Kent, Ohio, 1962).
Peggy Sheppard , Andersonville Georgia USA (Leslie, Ga.,
1973) is a collection of twelve stories concerning Andersonville
and Wirz .
Included is the controvers y of the Wirz monument.
Sources illustrating that the controversy concerning Wirz still
exists are Rober t E. and Katharine M. Morseberger, "After Andersonville: The First War Crimes Trial , " Civil War Times Illustrated,
XIII (July 1974) , 30-4 1 , and Darrett B. Rutman, " The War Crimes and
Trial of Henry Wirz, " Civi l War History , VI (June 1960) , 117 - 133.
Each examines the evidence and the trial proceedings. The Horsebergers , while finding wirz innocent of the charges, conclude
that he was justly punished.
Rutman sees him as a scapegoat,
the victim of a legal lynching .
Two final sources , John S . Blay, The Civil War : A Pictorial
Profile (New York , 1958) and J . G. Randall and David Donald, Civil
War and Reconstruction (Lexington, Hass ., 1969), are general works
wh i ch cont ain valuable information.
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BRANDY STATION:

THE TURNING POINT

In the summer of 1863, the cavalry of the Army of Northern
Virginia and its commander, General James Ewell Brown Stuart, were
riding high.
The Confederate troopers were at the crest of a
string of continuous victories over their Northern counterparts,
and could look back on such exploits as riding around the Army of
the Potomac in the Peninsular Campaign l and carrying off the
audacious Chambersburg raid. 2 The cavalry was still romantic,
even after two years of warfare, and feats such as these made it
so. And with such background, no one thought the Federals might
soon become worthy adversaries , least of all Stuart himself.
After the close of the Chancellorsville campaign, Jeb Stuart's
cavalry headquarters was moved to Culpeper County, Virginia, so
the men could rest and recuperate. While there, the main body of
cava lry was joined by Beverly Robertson ' s brigade from North
Carolina, "Grumble" Jones (so-called due to his acerbic personality)
from the Shenandoah Valley, and most of Wade Hampton's men from
South Carolina and Mississippi. Men from the commands of the two
Lees (Fitzhugh and W. H. F. "Rooney") and Jones' brigade returned
from furlough and fresh mounts; Major Beckham's horse artillery
was also reinforced. 3 Altogether, on May 30, 1863, Stuart had five
brigades with 21 regiments, 9,536 men total, his strongest force
ever . 4 The showman in Stuart prompted him to stage a review on the
fifth of June, complete ,vith a mock charge and cannons firing blanks
to delight the ladies in attendance; a second review, on the eighth,
was attended by General Robert E. Lee (who vetoed the planned mock
charge, to save wear and tear on the horses).
After the second
review Stuart's men prepared for early movement on the ninth, to
cover the start of Lee's invasion of the North. 5
The Federal cavalrymen were aware of the Confederate concentration, though prone to overestimating Stuart's strength. 6 The greatest fear of the Northern commanders was another Confederate raid,
and most thought that to be Stuart's mission. 7 To pre-empt such a
raid, General Alfred Pleasonton, commanding the cavalry of the Army
of the Potomac , determined to attack Stuart;8 Pleasonton, accord ing to his own account, used 10,981 cavalry and infantry.9
Unaware that so many of the enemy were near , the Confederates,
preparing to head North, were poorly positioned to repel an attack. lO
Fi tz Lee's brigade, under Colonel Tom l1unford, was miles from
Fleetwood, north of the Hazel River , near Oak Shade Church.
Rooney
Lee was further south , picketing tlel ford ' s Ford.
"Grumble" Jones '
Laurel Brigade was near Beverly Ford and St. James Church, picketing the ford and Rappahannock Station, the railroad crossing. Wade
Hampton's brigade was in reserve near Fleetwood, south of the
railroad.
Robertson's brigade was along the river below the railroad,
Charles A. Hood
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~icketing Kelly ' s and the l ower fords .
One battery of horse artil lery, Breathed's , was with Fitz Lee's brigade near Oak Shade; the
other four batteries were between Jones ' brigade and the
Rappahannock River , unsupported, the weak spot of the dispositions . ll

J

During the dark and hazy night of the eighth,12 the Federals
crept up to the river, camped silently and without fires , and
Ivaited to attack. 13 The Second and Third Cavalry Divisions, with
Russell's infantry brigade , were commanded by David Gregg; the
First Cavalry Division and Ames' infantry brigade were under John
Buford. Each cavalry division had with it two light batteries of
horse artillery.14 Buford was to cross at Beverly Ford, Gregg at
Kelly's Ford.
Pleasonton, thinking Stuart was concentrated at
Culpeper Court House , ordered his men to rendezvous at Brandy
Station and then simultaneously attack Stuart's p resumed po sition .
The infantry was to cover the lines of retreat.
Buford crossed
first, at dawn. IS
"Grumble" Jones heard the battle's opening clash as the sixth
Virginia , on picket, met the Federals only a few hundred ya rds in
front of the unsupported Confederate artillery . The Seventh
Virginia, the grand guard, was led into the attack by Jones himself, many troo pers mounting so fast they did not have time to put
on their boots or saddle their horses . The Seventh's charge was
rep ulsed and a mass of fleeing Confederates and advancing Federals
rode over the Confederate guns , whose crews were forced to defend
themselves with pistols and sponge staffs; but canister from
Captain J . H. Hart's two howitzers beat the Federals back, allowing the rest of the guns to escape and unlimber west of St. James
Church , where they were joined by Jones and his men.
But if
Federal Colonel B. F . " Grimes " Davis , l eading the attack , had not
been killed at the ford (Causing the narrow road to clog up with
men) , it is like l y that the guns would have been taken at the v er y
start of the action. 16
At h i s headquarters on F l eetwood Heights, Stuart, having heard
the gunfire from Beverly Ford and received a message from Jones ,
set about to reinforce his l ines . 17 Hampton, minus one regiment
left in reserve at Brandy Station , was sent to Jones' right; Rooney
Lee was sent to Jones ' left.
Stuart intended to bring in Fitz
Lee ' s br i gade also b u t the o r ders he sent were unclear (Hunford ' s
report reveals they mere l y said to corne "this way"), so Hunford
j ust went to Welford ' s Ford and effectively took himself out of the
action .
I n the meantime , Jones had fo r med a l i n e around St . James
Church .
Federals rushed out of the woods in a charge and we r e
repulsed by Beckham ' s guns , so the Twelfth Virginia, Fourteenth
Virginia, and Thir t y - fifth Battalion countercharged; they pushed
the Federals back into the woods and then withdrew . Hampton and
Lee had corne u p o n Jones ' f l anks , forming a line of batt l e with a
sharp right angle around St . James Church . Buford , opposite the
angle , was blocked;18 facing a deep re-entrant in his lines, his

29
flanks were over lapped and he was forced to withdraw part of his
forces to protect his lines of retreat. 19
Because of the unorthodox position of the Confederate artil lery, his overes timation of the size of the Confederate forces ,
and the hard fight Buford was having, Pleasonton concluded that
Stuart had been ready for the assault. 2 0 His 7:40 message to
Hooker reads:
"The enemy is in strong cavalry force here. We
have had a severe fight . They were al"are of our mov ement , and Ivere
prepared.,,2l Though he had as yet recei v ed no word from Gre g g,
Pl easonton decided to just hold on in the Confederate front and
wait for his left-hand column to hit the enemy's rear . The
Confederates were driving Buford back toward the river when Gre g g's
guns were heard in the Confederate rear .
Though ordered to cross the Rappahannock at dawn, Colonel
Alfred N. Duffie's Second Division had started late and had unex plained trouble getting to Kell y 's Ford, so Pleasonton's left did
not cross the ri v er until after fi v e o ' clock in the morning. 22
Gregg bore on toward Stevensburg and, at a fork in the road two
miles from the ford , sent Duffie on toward Stevensburg while he
headed for Brandy Station .
Stuart's adjudant, Major H. B. HcClellan, and some couriers
were the onl y Confederates on Fleetwood Heights,23 since the regiment Hampton had left in reserve at Brandy Station ha d been sent
to meet Duffie at Stevensburg. MCClellan sent urgent messages to
Stuart asking for help ; at first Stuart did not believe it possible
that the enemy was in his rear (since Robertson should have been
guarding the right flank), but more messages and gunfire from
Fleetwood soon confirmed the initial report.
Stuart then ordered
Jones to send his guns and two regiments to Fleetwood, and followed
in p erson; when he arrived, Stuart saw the danger and ordered in
two of Hampton's regiments. 24
Low on ammunition , Lieutenant John W. Carter ' s six- pounder
was at the base of Fleetwood Heights; McClellan got the gun onto
the hill and had it begin a slow cannonade of Gregg ' s approaching
column. Gregg stopped his ad vance to form up for an all - out
attack, naturally assuming that such a commanding position Ivould
be held in strength; this delay enabled the Confederates to arrive
just in time to keep Gregg from gaining the key to the battle . 25
Beginning shortl y after 10:00 A. M., Fleetwood Heights became
the scene of " ... the greatest cavalry fighting of the war.,,26 The
Twelfth Virginia and Thirty-fifth Battalion came up the hill just
as Carter ' s gun, ammunition exhausted, was withdrawing and Colonel
Sir Perc y Wy ndham's First New Jersey was coming up the other side;
the Confederates attacked without going into line , so only the
first ranks were effecti v e and the charge was ridden off b y the
Federals. Wyndham got three guns onto the hill; t1ajor C. E.
Flournoy ' s Sixth Virginia and then the Thirty -fifth Battalion rode
over them, but both Confederate units were forced back.
Lunsford
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Lomax ' s Eleventh Virginia carne in next and captured the guns for
the third and final time , turning them on the Federals , who were
forced back toward Stevensburg . Confederate guns were brought u p ,
their gunners at times having to fight hand - to - hand . Then
Hampton ' s men carne up in line abreast; Young ' s Cobb Legion and
Black ' s First South Carolina hit the Federal front , while Baker ' s
First North Carolina and Waring ' s Jeff Davis Legion swept around
the hill to hit the Federal right . The y pushed the Federals off
the hill and their pursuit was sto p ped only by Confederate guns
mistakenly firing on them , which enabled the Federals to get to the
woods . While Hampton secured F l eetwood Heights , Harman and White
attacked again , cutting off the part of the First New Jersey that
was on Barbour ' s Hill; the rest of the Federal regiment formed a
rear guard under Wyndham ' s personal control on the Brandy Station
road , repu l sing two attacks . 27
The Con f ederate troopers were unaware that the fragment of the
First New Jersey on Barbour ' s Hill was unsupported , and the Con federate artillerymen did not even know they were there; taking
the onl y avenue of escape open to them , the Federals rode over and
through the guns , cutting their way back to Gregg . One gunner,
Private Sud l ey , knocked a Federal off his horse with a sponge staff
and captured him . 28 The First New Jersey ' s escape was the last
action on Fleetwood Heights .
As the fighting raged around Fleetwood Heights , the extreme
right of the Confederate position was being engaged by Duffie ,
advancing up the road to Stevensburg .
Robertson saw and reported
the advances of both Gregg and Duffie, and was told by Stuart to
hold his position; technical l y, he followed orders , but he failed
to engage either Federa l column , and so only two regiments (the
Fourth Virginia and the Second South Carolina) opposed Duffie ' s
four . Perhaps it would be more accurate to say it was one to four,
because the Fourth Virg i nia twice broke and ran without firing a
shot ; Heros von Borcke , the boisterous Prussian who had attached
himself to Stuart ' s staff , had to use the flat of his saber on men
to maintain even a semb l ance of order . Somehow the h/o regiments
man aged to hold Duffie up unti l he r ejoined Gregg (who by tha t
time had been forced off Fleetwood Heights) . 29 The main resu l ts
of this fight \-Jere the deaths of Colonel Frank Hampton , I'lade ' s
brother , and Captain Wi ll Farley , Stuart ' s chief scout .
Far l ey had
been mounted next to Co l o n e l Ca l braith Butl er , the commander of
the Second South Caro l ina , when a richochetting ca n nonbal l cut off
But l er ' s foot , passed through and ki ll ed both their horses , and
severed Farl ey ' s right l eg at the knee . Far l ey , being carried from
the f i e l d , asked for h i s l eg ; it was brought to him and he hugged
it , t hen laid it gently on the ground , saying with a smi l e , " I t' s
an old friend , gentleman , and I do not wish to part with it ." He
said goodbye to everyone near , then died . 30
Gregg rejoined Buford in front of St . James Church as Stuart ' s
troopers formed up for another attack ; Buford , who had been advancing against the weak fo r ce l eft before him whe n the Con federates
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went to meet the threat at Fleetwood Heights, was not stopped
as the enemy returned. 31 Pleasonton now decided to withdraw, Gregg
recrossing the river at Rappahannock Station and Buford at Beverly
Ford. 32
Casualties were around 900 for the Federals, 500 for the Confederates. 33 The Federals took three colors and 279 prisoners;
the Confederates captured three pieces of artillery and about 400
prisoners. 34
One of Pleasonton's stated reasons for withdrawing was his
supposed knowledge that massive Confederate infantry support was
coming up; Gregg even contended he had been forced to break off the
attack on Fleetwood Heights because he had been attacked by Confederate infantrymen jumping from a train. 35 But Stuart's report and
the reports of the commanders of the infantry and its artillery
are clear; no Confederate infantry was engaged. 36 Perhaps the
Federals did learn that Confederate infantry was near, but this is
by no means certain. 37
Gregg did, as he claimed, take physical possession of the place
Stuart's H.Q. had been located the day before. 38 But he and
Pleasonton also claimed to have captured Stuart's papers; in the
final version of the story, these papers supposedly disclosed all
of Robert E. Lee's plans for the upcoming Gettysburg campaign, and
many later writers believed the story. The only loss of any documents the Confederates acknowledged were Major Beckham's official
files, in a desk which bounced out of a wagon close to the start
of the action. 39 Recently, two of the documents the Federals captured were discovered; one was an order of march for Jones' brigade
in the June eighth review, the other a letter from a Confederate
trooper (identified only as "Bill") to his father, relating camp
gossip that Stuart was about to make a raid. 40 The only logical
conclusion is that Pleasonton's claims of having captured vitallyimportant documents were as much flights of fanc y as Gregg's claim
that he had been attacked by a trainload of Confederate infantry.
Pleasonton claimed to have stopped the raid Stuart planned
for the tenth, but Stuart had never planned a raid for Pleasonton
to have stopped. Also, he claimed to have crippled Stuart so badly
that he could not adequately screen Lee's advance North, forcing
Lee to go through the Shenandoah Valley rather east of the Blue
Ridge Mountains. 41 Actually, Lee had planned all along to go down
the Valley, and if Stuart had been "crippled" he did not show it in
the hard month of fighting to come around Aldie, Upperville, etc.
The other Federal claim (that Pleasonton had intended to make a
reconnaisance in force) has already been handled,42 but even had
this been his mission, he failed; he may have seen some Confederate
infantry but he did not even identify the unit, let alone uncover
Lee's plans for the upcoming campaign. 43
Other than the initial disposition of forces and the disgraceful behavior of the Fourth Virginia, the main faults on the Confederate side lie with Munford and Robertson.
Both failed to follow
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the great maxim of tactics, move to the sound of the guns, but at
least ~lunford carried on a little desultory snir.>ing; Robertson
simply watched two Federal columns march by his positions,44 and
this is certainly not what Stuart meant when he told Robertson to
hold his position - it smacks of, if not cowardice , at least
extreme timidity .
Robertson had no place in uniform, let alone on
the field of battle.
The South was used to glittering victories from Stuart and,
from the Southern viewpoint , " . . . Brandy Station can hardly be
called a victory . ,, 45 The newspapers attacked him viciously, the
Richmond Examiner leading the way , the Dispatch , Sentinel, 'Nhig,
and Richmond Enquirer following . ~6 Stuart and his men of course
resented this , but the fact is that Stuart had been surorised,
though neither he nor his officers would admit it. 47 Confederate
General Dorsey Pender made the most balanced comment on the battle :
"I suppose it is all right that Stuart should get all the blame ,
for when anything handsome is done he gets all the credit.
A bad
rule either way ." 48
\-Iho won the battle? Clearly, it was the Confederates.
Their
l osses were approximately half the Fedrals', they captured three
guns , denied Pleasonton the knowledge of Lee ' s p lans and screened
the Army of Northern Virginia from the enemy, and retained
possession of the field .
But for the first time the Federals had
attacked Stuart, fought we ll throughout, and retired in good order.
By all accounts , Stuart was greatly disturbed by the outcome of
the battle;49 D. S . Freeman believes he " ... almost certainly .... "
made his disastrous ride around Meade in Pennsylvania to repolish
his tarnished image. 50 It is impossible to say so for sure but,
given Stuart ' s flamboyant personality , it is very likely .
The superior resources of the North were making themselves
felt, especially in the area of remounts; as the war dragged on,
what few horses the Confederate troopers could find grew weaker and
weaker .
And hard-fighting Union cavalrymen li ke Sheridan, Custer,
and Kilpatrick were corning to the fore .
But it was Brandy Station
that, in the words of Freeman , " ... made the Federal cavalry .,, 5l
All accounts agree that the battle sent the morale of the Federal
troopers soaring. 52 It is hard to see why , since they lost three
guns and almost twice as many men as the Confederates , but morale
is an intangible .
The Confederate troo pers would never again have
everything their own way , because their opponents had corne of age .
Brandy Station was the turning point in the cavalry war .
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If- so , why did his
" reserve" consist of McClel l an , a few couriers , and one gun that
was low on ammunition? Obviously Stuart was attempting to claim
credit for a strictly- fortuitous circumstance.
26Thomason , Stuart , 405 .
27Ibid .; McClellan , " Fl eetwood , " 398 - 399 ; O. R., Ser. I , Vo l.
II , 681 , 749 , 682 , 72 1 -722; Pt. I , 1045 , 966 ; Freeman ,
Lee ' s Lieutenants , III , 10 - 11; Ed\~ard G. Longac r e , " Sir Percy
Wyndham ," Civil War Times Il l ustrated , VII (Dec . 1968) , 18.
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28Freeman , Lee ' s Lieu t e n an t s , III , 11; O.R. , Ser . I , Vol .
XXVI I, Pt . I I, 684 .
290 . R., Ser . I , Vol . XXVII , Pt . I , 691 , 1045; Pt . II , 680 ,
73 1, 683; Freeman , Lee ' s Lieutenants , III , 1 4 ;
von Borcke , Memoirs , II , 272 - 274 .
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30Freeman , Lee ' s Lieut enants , III , 14-15; Thomason , Stuart ,
407 - 408 .
310 . R., Ser . I , Vol . XXVI I , Pt. I I, 682; Pt . I , 1 045 ; Thomason ,
Stuart-;-:ro7 ; Newha ll, " Bever l y For d ," 140 - 141; McClellan , " Fleetwood ,"
399 400; von Borcke , Memoi r s , II , 277.
320 . R. , Ser . I , Vol . XXV I I , Pt . I , 1 045 . Here , Pleasonton
contended he was withdrawing because he knew Confederate infantry
was corning up . This contention was picked up by Coddington ,
Gettysburg, 58; Thomason, Stuart , 407; Newhall , " Beverly Ford ,"
1 42 ; and Comte de Paris, Civil War , III , 457 . But , as is pointed
out in Coddington , Gettysburg , 616n. , at 8:00 P.M . on June ninth
Pl easonton said he withdrew because he knew many Confederate infantrymen were near and since he had maimed Stuart; the next day , he
c l aimed he withdrew because he had exhausted his reserves; and his
story changed again in his ful l battle report , in which he said he
withdrew due to the presence of Confederate infantry , this time
omitting his claim that he had crippled Stuart .
Gregg , " Union Cavalry ," 376 ; Newhall, "Beverly Ford , " 142 ,
144- 1 45 ; Coddington , Gettysburg, 58-59 , 617n . ; and Comte de Paris ,
Civil War , III, 467 - 468 ; all claim that the Federals retreated unmo l ested . Von Borcke , Memoirs , II, 278; and Wise , Long Arm ,
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592-593; contend that Confederate pursuit was forcibly stopped only
by fire from Federal infantry and artillery on the other side of
the river. Note that Gregg and Newhall , Union officers, take a
position diametrically opposed to that of von Borcke, a Confederate
officer. Given the frequent lack of veracity exhibited by both
sides, there seems to be no way to reconcile this conflict of
sources.
33Pleasonton admitted an aggregate loss of 970, with the
Second Division not accounted for: O.R., Ser. I, Vol . XXVII , Pt.
I, 905. The compilers of O.R . arrived at an aggregate loss for the
Federals of 866: O.R ., Se~, Vol. XXVII, Pt. I, 168-170. But
another report arrives at an aggregate loss of 837 : O. R., Ser. I,
Vo l. XXVII, Pt. I, 193. Pleasonton claimed to have lost 356 men
captured or missing - O.R., Ser. I, Vol . XXVII , Pt. 1,193 - but
McC lellan claimed the Confederates captured 363 men: McClellan ,
"Fleetwood," 403. Stuart's tabular statement of casualties holds
an aggregate loss for the Confederates of 485, and McC lell an agrees :
O.R ., Ser . I, Vol. XXVII, Pt. I, 719; t·1 cClellan, "Fleetwood," 403.
But Stuart's totals include only 132 missing, while Pleasonton
claimed to have taken 279 prisoners: O. R., Ser. I, Vol . XXVII ,
Pt. I, 1045. Both Freeman, Le e 's Lieutenants, III, 13; and
Thomason, Stuart, 408; for some reason agree on casualties of 523
for the Confederates and 936 for the Federals, but neither figure
is in any of the official records.
340.R., Ser. I, Vo l. XXVII, Pt. I, 1045, 193; Freeman, Lee's
Lieutenants, III, 13; Thomason, Stuart, 408; McC l ellan, "Fleetwood,"
403.
Though Pleasonton does not refer to the loss of any artil l ery,
the evidence is overwhelming that three guns were in fact lost by
the Federals, though whether or not they were in working order is
a bone of contention.
350 . R., Ser. I, Vol. XXVII, Pt. I, 903; Pt . III, 49.
36Ibid., Vol. XXVII, Pt. 11,374,431,439-440,546,564,592,
594, 5~599, 600, 683; von Borcke, Hemoirs, II, 277; Freeman,
Lee's Lieutenants, III, 11-12.
37McClellan, "Fleetwood," 400; Wise, Long Arm, 593-594; Newhall ,
"Beverly Ford," 145.
38Gregg, "Union Cavalry," 376.
390.R., Ser. I, Vo l. XXVII, Pt. 1,1045; Pleasonton, "Gettysburg,"
449-450; Comte de Paris, Civil War, III, 464; Coddington, Gettysburg,
61-62; Thomason, Stuart, 401-402; Davis, Stuart, 306.
40Coddington, Gettysburg, 61-62. Coddington claims Pleasonton
fabricated the story about capturing documents to form a basis for
his perverting Hooker's orders into calling for a reconnaisance in
force.
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41 0 . R. , Ser. I, Vol. XXVII, Pt . I, 904 ; Coddington , Gettysburg ,
62; Pleasonton, "Gettysburg," 450; Doubleday, "Chancellorsville, "
84 , 88 .
42See note 8.
43Coddington , Gettysburg, 60-63; Thomason, Stuart , 408; Comte
de Paris , Civil \"ar , III, 4 69 ; Mosby , Memoirs , 204.
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45Susan L. Blackford , Letters from Lee's Army : or Memoirs of
Life in and Out of the Army in Virginia During the War Between the
States (New York, 1962), 175.
46Davis , Stuart, 310 -31 3; Coddington , Gettysburg , 60; Freeman ,
Lee's Lieutenants , III, 51, 19; Williams , Lincoln Finds A General ,
II, 624.
4 7 Coddington, Gettysburg, 58-59, 60, 619n.
48Freeman, Lee's Lieutenants, III, 18-19 .
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49Ibid . , III , 12-1 3 , 1 8 ; Williams, Lincoln Finds A General, II,
-50Freeman, Lee ' s Lieutenants , III xi .
51Ibid . , III, 18n .

52 I bid . , III; Gregg, "Union Cavalry ," 376 ; O. R ., Ser. I , Vol .
1, 904; Wi lliams, Lincoln Finds A General , II , 623;
Thomason, Stuart, 409; Coddington, Gettysburg, 64 ; Comte de Paris ,
Civil War , III, 468-469; Russell F. Weigley, "Da vid McMurtrie Gregg A Profi le , " Civil War Times Illustrated, I (Nov. 1962), 13;
Joseph B. Mitchel l, Decisive Battles of the Civil ,var (New York ,
1955) , 141.
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CRITICAL ESSAY ON SOURCES
The most important primary source for this paper was The \var
of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the
Union and Confederate Armies (128 vols., Washington, 1880-1901),
Ser. I, Vol. XXVII, Pts. I-III.
Parts I and II, containing the
reports of various commanders, were absolutely essential; Part III,
a gathering of miscellaney, was less important. This work is
quite nearly frightening; the so-called index is extremely difficult to use, there seems to be no logic to the arrangement of information, but it is indispensible because it contains timely,
first-hand accounts.
The next best primary source is The Annals
of the War Written by Leading Participants North and South
(Philadelphia, 1879); a composite work written a few years after
the war, the quality varies with the quality of the individual
articles. The best article is H. B. McC lell an, "The Battle of
Fleetwood," 392-403; written by Stuart's adjudant, it is marred
by its pro-Stuart bias, which leads to fantastic conclusions.
F. C. Newhall, "The Battle of Beverly Ford," 134-146, written by
one of Pleasonton's aides-de-camp, slights Gregg's part in the
battle since the author was with Buford, and is marred by its proNorthern bias. The author's vainglory and pro- Northern bias gets
full rein in David McM. Gregg, "The Union Cavalry at Gettysburg,"
372-379.
By far the worst is Alfred Pleasonton, "The Campaign of
Gettysburg," 447-459, which makes ridiculous claims as to the
effects of the battle and resorts to falsification of evidence to
"prove" its points.
Susan L. Blackford, Letters from Lee's Army:
or Memoirs of Life in and Out of the Army in Virginia During the
War Between the States (New York, 1962) is extremely interesting
but of little help; it is chiefly useful for illuminating Southerner's attitudes during the war.
Of the several secondary sources used, the best is Douglas S.
Freeman, Lee's Lieutenants: A Study in Command (3 vols ., New
York, 1944), III .
It contains extensive footnoting and bibliography, and the conclusions are judicious. Next in usefulness
is Edwin B. Coddington, The Gettysburg Campaign: A Study in
Command (New York , 1968); extensively footnoted (though gathered
in the back and so hard to use) and containing a long series of
conclusions drawn from the battle that faults the Federals almost
entirely, it still manages to leap to the conclusion that the battle
was a Northern victory. Jennings C. \Vise, The Long Arm of Lee:
The History of the Artillery of the Army of Northern Virginia
(New York, 1959; first published 1915), though unfootnoted, is a
ve r y competent work; while focusing on just one combat arm, it
gives a detailed account of the battle and the pro-South bias is
remarkably moderate. Abner Doubleday, "Chancellorsville and
Gettysburg," Campaigns of the Civil War (8 vols., New York, 1963;
first published 1882) is useful chiefly for its edifying asides
and representations of the Northern view of the war by a former
Federal general, and the pro-Northern bias which intrudes is nowhere
nearly as bad as that in Kenneth P. Williams, Lincoln Finds A
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General: A Military Study of the Civil War (4 vols. , New York ,
1 949) , II.
The Northern slant , along with numerous factua l
mistakes , dictate that this work be used only when it can be
verified.
Louis Phillippe Albert d ' Orleans, Comte de Paris ,
History of the Civil War in America (4 vols., Philadelphia, 18751888) , III , is an interesting work written from the point of view
of a foreign observer, but too prone to believe all the assertions
of Northern officers, and contains some factual mistakes . Of
little use was John B. Mitchell, Decisive Battles of the Civil
War (New York , 1955) .
Of the two biographies of Stuart used , the better is John
W. Thomason , Jr. , Jeb Stuart (New York, 1930); a popu l ar biography
without footnotes or bib l iography, it is marred by its pro-Stuart
bias and sensationalism . Surprisingly (since many other secondary sources cite it quite often) a very poor work is Burke Davis ,
Jeb Stuart: The Last Cavalier (New York , 1957) ; the footnotes are
extreme l y weak , it is marred by its sensationalism and pro - Stuart
bias, contains factual mistakes , and the account of the battle is
ra t.her cursory .
'fwo works of memoirs were used: Heros von Borcke, Memoirs
of the Confederate War for Independence (2 vols ., New York , 1 938;
first published 1866) , II ; and John S . Mosby , The Memoirs of
Co l onel John S . Mosby (Ne\~ York, 1969). Both men were very devoted
to Stuart and the South but , whereas Mosby seems dedicated to
g l orifying Stuart , von Borcke seems dedicated to glorifying von
Borcke. Von Borcke contains some factual mistakes , Mosby some
dubious conclusions ; high l y readable and entertaining , both must
be used wi t h caution .
Wi l bur S. Nye , "Brandy Station, June 9: Stuart v . Pleasonton , "
Civil War Times Illustrated , II (July 1963) is a good, unfootnoted
introductory study of the battle , though perhaps too hard on the
Fede r al mistakes and too easy on the Confederate . Other articles
were : Roy P . Stonesifer , Jr. , "The Union Cavalry Comes of Age ,"
Civil War History , Vol. XI , No . III, 1965 : " ' Grumble' Jones: A
Personality Profi l e ," Civil War Times Illustrated , VII (June 1968);
Edward G. Longacre, " Sir Percy Wyndham ," Civil Ivar Times Illustrated,
VII (Dec . 1968) ; and Russe ll F. Weigley , "David McMurtries Gregg A Profi l e ," Civil War Times Illustrated , I (Nov. 1962) .
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JOHN WALTER CHRISTIE
AND THE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT, 1916-1945
The 1920's and 1930's were the formative years of u.S. armor
doctrine and tank design.
John Walter Christie was the one man
who dominated U.S. tank design during those years.
Christie was
a "rugged individualist" whose impetuous qualities were "scarcely
conducive to harmonious relations with the Army officials with
whom he dealt. ,,1 Probably ahead of his time, he contributed more
than any other non-Russian to the state of Soviet armor design during the early years of Soviet armor development. 2
Unfortunately, Christie came to grips with the U.S. military's
new tecnhical-corporate approach to managing the designin~ of
armored fighting vehicles (AFV's) and their construction.
Little is known of Christie's early life. He was born in River
Edge, New Jersey, on 6 May 1864.
In 1881 he went to work at the
Delameter Iron Works in New York City. vlhile working at Delameter,
he attended night classes at Cooper Union.
Later, Christie worked
as a consultant engineer for a steamship line. At the turn of the
century he entered the automotive field.
Christie built his own
cars and tested them in races at Daytona and Indianapolis.
In 1904
he promoted a front wheel drive for cars.
In 1912 he began to
manufacture wheeled tractors to be used to pull fire fighting equipment.
In 1916 he developed a front wheel drive truck which was
used in the Army's Punitive Expedition into Mexico. 4
The first official recognition of Christie by the U.S. Army
was on 22 December 1916 when Christie's firm, the Front Wheel Drive
Motor Company, was awarded a contract to produce a pilot model antiaircraft gun motor carriage. This vehicle, despite being overweight and having an inadequate gun mount, was enough to ensure
Christie's consideration in future contracts. 5
Events were soon to bring Christie and the Army back together.
In April 1919, the General Headquarters of the American Expeditionary Forces appointed a board to consider the lessons of World l-lar I
as they might affect the organization and tactics of the combat arms.
The report of the board stated that the tank was an infantry support
vehicle and that a high speed medium tank should be developed.
This report set the stage for determining the role of armored forces
in relation with the other combat arms.
The report, in considering
a high speed vehicle, made the work of John Christie of obvious importance to the U.S . military.
Edward G. Miller
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On 30 June 19 1 9 , a work order making reference to Christie
was placed by the Artillery Division Manufacturing Service to
develop a convertible tank capable of movement on both wheels and
tracks . This idea was not new in military circles .
For example
in 1918 then Colone l George S . Patton Jr . noted that " ' The perfect
tank would travel on its own wheels, .
. and mount itself on
catipillars /iic7 on entering battle . '"
Also the U.S . Tank Corps
was a n xious to try the convertible concept.
Con cerned U. S. officials wanted an American alternative to British and French
rhomboidal designs .
Genera l Samuel Rockenbach , wartime head of
the U. S . Tank Corps , wanted Christie to "' go ahead with a l l the
energy possible . ,,' 6
Christie produced the M1919 as a result .
In early 1919 Patton
heard of Christie ' s ",ork . Patton went to the Elizabeth , New Jersey ,
headquarters of the Front Wheel Drive Motor Company and found
Christie a " tall , erect, and scholarly looking man of profound
technical competence and abundant enthusiasm and his tank the best
lAF'!] he LPatto~7 had yet encountered . "
Patton arranged for a demonstration of the vehicle before a
board of officers from the Ordinance Department . The tank was
driven under its own power to the test which was located at Fort
t·leade , Mary l and :
250 mi l es at 30 m. p . h .- quite a feat for the day.
Patton asked the officers if they would l ike a cha n ce to drive
the vehic l e for themse l ves.
When none responded , Patton let his
wife drive the tank .
She ruined her summer dress, but hand l ed the
tank quite well .
After that demonstration , Pa t ton again offered
to l et his visitor s drive the tank .
However , the visitors said
that they had seen enough . Christie was turned down because in the
opinion of the Ordinance officers the vehic l e was too difficult to
maneuver. 7 The fiasco at Fort Meade, while i n teresting , did not
help Christie ' s efforts .
He could little afford to embarrass any one - much less the peop l e who wou l d determine if his vehicle could
be used by the Ar my .
Patton and a g r oup of officers prepared a report dated
30 October 1919 regarding t he tests of the Christie Vehic l e :
The powerplan t is unique in three particul ars:
First : It is set across the length of the machine , thus
saving space
Second : The powerplant is completel y equipped with
large ball bearings at points of friction.
Third :
frame ,

The motor and transmission are mounted on a sub. and are not bolted to the armor .

Further , this machine gives four forward speeds and
four reverse .

43
Suspension: six of the eight wheels . . . have independent spring action on the spiral springs .
Recommendation: The
wil·l be accomplished
design and construct
features of the tank
Tank Corps.8

board is of the opinion that much
if Mr. Christie is empowered to
a tank combining the mechanical
with the tactical ideas of the

This report impressed officers with the Ordinance Department.
The design appeared adequate on paper, but limited tests were insufficient to prove the capabilities of the vehicle.
It now
remained to be seen how the vehicle could be altered to fit specifications of the Ordinance Department. Patton felt that even if
the vehicle did not meet all specifications, it was worth consideration and should be pursued because it was far advanced for its
time.
Despite differing opinions regarding the M19l9, a contract
between Christie and the Ordinance Department was signed on
15 June 1920. Christie was ready to develop what might become a
prototype for a new series of American tanks. 9
However, Christie found himself forced to work within numerous
guidelines.
In 1919, the Chief of Ordinance had suggested a
permanent tank development policy.
The General Staff decided to
abolish the Tank Corps. On 5 June 1920 the National defense Act
placed the tanks under control of the Infantry as a separate and
competing combat arm.
The Infantry would establish requirements
for tanks and report to the General Staff which would then authorize procurement as necessary.lO
The Adjutant General's Office established the guidelines
for tank development. The guidelines were established in line with
current Army policy. Weight limitations were set on light and
medium tanks (5 and 15 tons respectively), on numbers of different
types, and stated that the mission of the tank was to "'facilitate
. . . advance of the rifleman . . • . ,,,11 Christie had to work
within these guidelines if he was to sell his vehicles.
In 1922, Christie resorted to political action to influence
the War Department. Senator James Frelinghuysen of New York was
enlisted by Christie to influence the funding of his vehicle designs.
Senator Frelinghuysen was advised by the Ordinance Department that
limited funds for development prevented further extension of
Christie's work.
Also in 1922, Christie developed an amphibious 76mm selfpropelled gun motor carriage which was tested in New York City in
February 1923. The hull of the vehicle was made of plate steel with
the sides packed with cork to increase buoyancy. Two rear mounted
propellors provided power while in the water.
The vehicle could
attain a speed of 25 m.p.h. on a level road. When tested in New York,
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the vehicle climed a 40 degree slope at the foot of the Pallisades
of the Hudson and crossed a two mile wide stretch of the Hudson
River against a strong tide in 45 minutes.
A Christie amphibian was used by the Marine Corps in its 1924
maneuvers on Culebra Island off Puerto Rico.
The vehicle was
loaded onto the deck of a submarine, and after the submarine submerged, the amphibian floated to the surface and swam to shore .
Some Marine officers saw the tactical possibilities of the amphibian-particularly in river crossing operations. Unfortunately ,
tight money and resistance to change by some senior ~larine officers
quieted the enthusiasm of some more progressive officers . As a
resul t, the U. S. entered l~orld \', ar II without an amphibious tank .
Such a vehicle would have proved valuable in the amphibian operations conducted during the war . 12
Then carne the bombshell . On 1 July 1924 the Christie program
was discontinued by the Army because of the costs involved . The
program had cost the Ordinance Department $82 , 000 not including the
test expenses and $100,000 paid to Christie for his patents. The
Ordinance Department claimed that the total cost of the Christie
program to date was almost one million dollars.
The so-called }lodel 1940 was introduced by Christie in 1928.
Between 1924 and 1928 Christie had not ended his work in designing
AFV ' s , and the M1940 was a product of five years of development
I.ork . The H1940 I.as supposed to have been ten years ahead of its
time, hence the designation M1940. According to Christie the
M1928/M1940 cost $382,000.
It was in this vehicle that Christie
first employed his helicoil spring suspension system.
Christie
called it the " coil spring knee action suspension . " Each wheel
I~as independently mounted on a pivot arm which was linked separatel y
to a long adjustable coil spring positioned vertically between an
inner and outer hull plate. 13
An October 1928 demonstration of the 111928 impressed Army
Chief of Staff General Charles P. Summerall.
He ordered that the
vehicle be tested by the Infantry Tank Board at Christie's expense .
However, the tests did not prove satisfactory and the vehicle was
returned to the Christie factory several times for repairs and
modifications.

On 19 February 1929, Secretary of War Dwiqht P . Davis directed
the Ordinance Department to purchase the M1928 for testing .
In
June 1929 , the tests were stopped and the vehicle was handed to the
Cavalry for further testing.
Patton was a member of the test board,
and along with other Cavalry officers felt the M1928 chassis could
be used as the basis for an armored car .
At that time , the Cavalry was considering the incorporation
of a tank platoon for duty with the First Cavalry Division . Some
Cavalrymen felt that the high speed Christie vehicle was suited to
developing doctrine which stressed speed , shock , mobility and
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firepower.
Farsighted officers wished to utilize a mechanized
force to execute missions based on a wide-ranging area of operation. The exponents of this doctrine in the u.s. were Adna
Chaffee"and Daniel VanVoorhis.
In Europe men such as B. H.
Lidell-Hart, G. LeQ. Martel, Heinz Guderian and Charles DeGaulle
were proponents of the new "lightning warfare."
When the Ordinance Department requested a price quote from
Christie, he offered to sell the design to Ordinance for $82,750
with the condition that the development cost be spread over
eight vehicles and with an additional $35,000 per vehicle as the
manufacturing cost . The Ordinance Department felt the cost too
high and Christie refused to lower the cost.
During the period of negotiations with Christie, the Infantry
planned to purchase a number of Christie vehicles. The appropriation for development of the T1E2 light tank ($250,000) was to be
used to purchase four or five Christie tanks for extended tests.
However, ~1ajor General Robert Allen, Chief of Infantry between
1925 and 1929, criticized the Ordinance Department for spending
too much time on the Christie program . He endorsed adoption of the
T1E2. The order to purchase the chassis was revoked on 6 January
1930.
Christie placed the only bid for contracts to be let for
light tank procurement in fiscal 1931. The new Chief of Ordinance ,
Major General Samuel Hof, opposed the purchase of the Christie
tanks because he thought Ordinance policy should be the procurement of a single model for tests. Then , if the vehicle was satisfactory, additional models could be purchased.
In June 1930, Christie informed the Ordinance Department that
the price of one M1928 with production rights was $135,000. The
price was unacceptable to officials. On 18 June Christie informed
the Ordinance Department that he was prepared to bring political
pressure to bear if nothing came of the negotiations.
Chief of Staff Summerall called a conference on 26 June to
"iron out" the troubles.
Summerall ordered a contract with Christie
be prepared . The contract, which was signed on 28 June, called
for the production of one M1928 at $55,000 plus $6,000 for testing .
On 1 July, $188,000 of the $250,000 appropriation for a light tank
then being developed by the Ordinance Department was recalled
because it had not been obligated due to the controversy with
Christie. 14
Although Christie had agreed to deliver the tank on 1 September,
it was delayed until 19 January 1931 partly because Christie had
previously signed a contract for purchase by the Soviet Union of
two Christie chassis. The members of a Soviet commission touring
the U.S. to inspect AFV designs were impressed with the Christie
convertible design : "'It is indeed unfortunate that he /Christie7
was born in the imperialist camp and hence not given the-chance to
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exploit his ideas to the full . ". Christie refused a direct offer
of money by the soviets .
Until the demonstration of the M1928 ,
the soviet Union had copied AFV designs from Germany and Britain.
The Soviets sought a simple, reliable tank, and apparently found
what they were looking for in the M192 8 . l5
Although the Ordinance Department was displeased by Christie ' s
dealings with the Soviets, two chassis were imported by the Soviet
Union in 1931. Manufacture of a Soviet copy of the M1928 began in
May 1 931 , resulting in the BT series which remained in production
until it was replaced by the T34 in 1940. Through the Christie
chassis, the Soviet union was able to translate its own blitzkrieg
theories into reality.16
Five Christie chassis were ordered by Poland in 1931. The
Polish government was alarmed because it could not understand the
U.S. government permitting such a sale to an unrecognized government
considered hostile by Poland.
Although Poland defaulted on the
order, when the 10TP appeared a few years later, it bore a striking resemblance to the M1931. l7
The next Chief of Infantry, Major General Stephen o. Fuqua,
strongly endorsed the Christie program .
He soon came into conflict
with the Ordinance Department .
The Infantry saw the Christie tank
as possessing the asset of strategic mobility because of its con vertibili t y . The Infantry realized that for fast breakthrough and
flanking movements speed was essential.
Ordinance , however , was concerned with the mechanical aspects
of the design.
As most tests had been conducted without armor or
weapo ns, the Ordinance Department was qu ite naturally concerned
about the mechanical reliability of the chassis.
Also , Ordinance
felt that all tests could be carried out with only one tank .
By late 1930 the controversy had reached the Senate War
Department Sub-Committee. At that time, Ordinance had carried out
tests which the tank could not pass . On 6 Ma rch 1931, Hof offered
Christie $54 , 000 for the tank and a complete set of dra\·lings.
Christie refused to sell unless he could be assured that the con tractor would be given an order for additional tanks .
Then General Douglas MacArthur , Army Chief of Staff , entered
the controversy .
In 1931, after assuming duties as Chief of Staff ,
MacArthur ordered that "'Every part of the Army will mechanize as
far as practicable and possib l e. '" He was advised by the Senate
committee that the entire appropriation for tanks in fiscal 1932
($250,000) was to be applied to Christie programs . MacArthur
advised the committee that the Christie tank had not passed all tests
and that it would be dangerous to apply all funds to testing such
vehic les.
Meanwhi le, Christie demanded that the tank be returned
to his factory to correct mechanical p roblems.
Once accomplished,
Christie planned to deliver the tank at the $54,000 figure.
The
Ordinance Department felt that the Christie tank did "demonstrate
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possibilities" but its limitations had not been determined . The
Infantry continued to request purchase, however, and Christie vIas
awarded a contract for development of what would be known as the
M1931. l8
A fully equipped ~1l93l (Army designation T3) weighed 10.5 tons.
A total of nine were built: numbers 1, 3, 4, 5 were delivered to
the Cavalry at Fort Knox, Kentucky. Numbers 2, 6, 7 were delivered
to the Infantry at Fort Benning, Georgia. The T3's delivered to
Fort Knox were designated Tl Combat Cars because the Cavalry was
forbidden to have tanks. The Cavalry Tl's were armed with a single
.50 cal. machine gun, the Infantry T3's were armed with a 37mm
cannon. The M193l utilized the helicoil spring suspension system. 19
A Tl platoon leader stationed at Fort Knox at this time noted
that the tanks \'lere highly regarded by their crews in spite of
mechanical troubles which involved mainly the transmission and
clutches.
In the Tl the gunner stood on the floor of the fighting compartment with his feet spread. The commander straddled the gunner
and stood on boxes of tools of ammunition crates. The driver was
directed by the foot signals of the commander.
The platoon leader also related the following song which was
composed in the General Mess at Fort Knox and sung to the tune of
the Caisson Song:
First on wheels then on tracks
As we break our bloody backs,
Keep those Christie's a'rolling along.
In and out, mostly out,
While you hear the Colonel shout,
Keep those Christie's a'rolling along.
For its Hi-Hi-Hee
In the Horse-Tank Cavalree.
Have on your clutches hard and strong
Where ere you go
You will always know
That those Christies are rolling along
Lord keep them rolling,
Keep those Christie's a'rolling along. 20
By 1932, working arrangements between Christie and the Ordinance
Department were impossible.
The quarrel now centered around specifications of a new "flying tank" at the same time Ordinance was trying to improve only existing convertible designs in line with
Infantry and Cavalry recommendations.
To add to the confusion,
the Chief of Staff recommended in 1931 that the Infantry and
Cavalry develop their own tank designs.
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On 18 May 1932 , Fuqua requested standardization of the T3/Tl.
Afterwards, the Infantry pointed out that the main trouble with the
T3 lay in the Ordinance-supplied engines.
So, by mid-1932, only
seven years from the start of World War II , the Army did not
possess a satisfactory tank.
Also in 1932, Christie introduced the design for an airborne
tank.
The new M1932 accommodated wings and a propellor. Airfoil
surfaces were to be attached to the hull of the tank with the
tracks to be used as a powered undercarriage. At the moment of
takeoff , power was to be transferred to a rear mounted propellor .
Later, Christie designed a system whereby an airplane would land
the tank, detach it, and fly off to pick up another . 21 Christie
managed to have this tank discussed in the U.S . House during the
May 1932 meeting on military appropriations .
In June 1932 , the Ordinance Department recommended a new plan
that would correct defects in the Christie design . Then , Christie
\~arned all competitors that he alone had the right to manufacture
new convertible designs . Though Christie threatened legal action ,
it was determined that under the 1920 agreement , the Army could
use all Christie patents.
In late 1932 Christie lectured at the Infantry School at
Fort Benning . He visited Fort Knox to discuss designs with
VanVoorhis . Throughout the period Christie maintained that "he
was the only man who knew how to build tanks .
. and that if he
did not get the contract for tanks in FY 1933 he would make trouble
for the company that did ."
Speaking before a House committee in 1933, MacArthur credited
the Christie tanks with 0 '
. awaking the Cavalry to the possibility of supplanting the horse in some of its units with fighting
machines. ' I'
It was determined by the Department of Experiment of the
Infantry School in late 1932 that the T3 ' s tested were superior
to any tank design developed by any concern to date.
The Department of Experiment recommended that the T3 be adopted as standard
and that all appropriations for fiscal 1933 be devoted to the T3 .
However, it was noted that the T3 needed improvement in crew room
and firepower.
When the Infantry invited bids in late 1932 for development
of a convertible tank, Christie refused to bid on the grounds that
the specifications were outdated and contained some requirements
that he refused to consider. The contract was awarded to other
firms . Then Christie asked the Secretary of War to reject all bids
and arrange for a meetinq of officers from the Ordinance Department,
Fort Knox, Fort Benning, and his own company in order to forumlate
new plans that met his standards.
This request was rejected because
the War Department felt that all requirements of the Infantry had
been met.
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Due to financial problems caused in part by the depression,
Christie made one las t attempt to sell the tank tested in early
19 31 . He offered to sell the design to the War Department for
$20,000, but in a letter to the Secretary of War, he remained critical of the Ordinance Department.
He was informed that funds were
not available.
Christie then had the tank parked and immobilized
in the courtyard of the State, War and Navy Building where it
remained until towed to the Ordinance Disposal yard .
Soon afterwards, a directive was issued by the Secretary of
War stipulating a weight limit of 7.5 tons for tanks and a lower
cost than current models under consideration. This directive was
responsibile for the eventual phasing out of the expensive convertible models. 22
In 1936 Christie went to England and met the same problems
that faced him in the U.S. He could not work within the British
system.
Christie managed to acquire the tank which had been towed
from the State, War and Navy Building and had it shipped to England.
It served as the basis for a series of British cruiser tanks.
For
the first time in Britain, thoughts of designing a tank with ease
of mass production in mind were considered.
With the funds acquired from the sale of the tank to the
British in 19 36 , Christie began to develop the M1937. He was told
by the Ordinance Department that the design did not meet service
requirements. Christie responded by threatening to see President
Roosevel t and War Department officials in order to get permission
to undertake production of large numbers of his tanks.
If this
action did not succeed, Christie was prepared to organize civilian
manufacturers in order to produce enough tanks so that one could
be furnished to each college in the U.S. to train future tankers. 23
This was the irrational response of a tired man to a system which
he could not tolerate.
In February 1941, representatives from the Ordinance Department
conferred with representatives of the Army Air Forces General Staff
and the Armored Force to consider the development of a special
light tank for use in airborne operations. The lightweight tanks
of the Christie design were studied. Christie was consulted, but
he stated that he was only an idea man and that the development
of ideas was the responsibility of others. 24
On 2 December 1941,
Staff recommended that a
the Tank Destroyer Force
system. Eventually this
tank destroyer which saw

a memorandum from G3 to G4 of the General
37 mm gun motor carriage be developed for
using the Christie helicoil suspension
vehicle was developed into the M18 "Hellcat"
considerable action in World ~~ar 11. 25

John Walter Christie died of chronic myocarditis at age 78 in
Falls Church, Virginia , on 11 January 1944. He was survived by his
wife, Elizabeth, and an adopted son, Edward. At the time of his
death, Christie and his son were working on a design which was called
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the M1950.
The M1950 bore a striking resemblance to the Sweedish
Stridvagn "5 " Type of 1963.
In 1945 his estate filed a brief with
the Chairman of the House Committee on claims requesting $250,000
as compensation for the development costs of Christie ' s designs.
The claim was never settled . 26
Development of a satisfactory medium tank was hampered for
years because of the amount of time and money invested in the
Christie program . Christie's tanks met the criterion for conduct
of high speed mechanized warfare, but mechanical problems prevented
their standardization . Most of the vehicles were tested without
armor, turret or \.,eapons . These tests offered little view of what
the designs could withstand in the field . Most of the designs
lacked features essential in an AFV . Unmodified, the Christie
suspension was too weak. The fighting compartments of the tanks
were too small, the engines were of a difficult to produce, liquid
cooled type and the tracks had a short life . The convertability
design was opposed to good engineering practice which did not seek
to design "two - purpose" equipment . Some engineers, however , saw
convertibility as an attractive feature . 27
Christie believed mobility and speed were more important than
firepower or armor protection :
My first object was to build a chassis that will protect
the man who is facing the enemy . Therefore, we built
a chassis with frontal lines and slopes that will make
it almost impossible to penetrate the chassis with any
type of projectile. Next, we constructed the chassis as
low as possible.
. we then turned to speed. L193~728
Christie "labored for years" to build a vehicle that would fit his
philosophy.
He reasoned that in mobile warfare the key to success
is mobility.
Unfortunately, his ideas developed so fast that
nothing could be proved. 29
Christie "did not fit into the corporateness of the Ordinance
Department." When he resorted to flashy public demonstrations,
political dealings, and the news media he fell into disfavor with
the Ordinance Department.
If the military charisterics of a new vehicle met the approval
of the General Staff, the ideas were then discussed by the Ordinance
Committee which was made up of members from the using arms.
Specifications would then be drawn up, and if the specifications
met all around approval, a design would then be prepared by the
Ordinance Department and the using arms. Then the ideas would
either be accepted or dropped.
Through the Ordinance Committee,
the Technical Staff maintained contact with the using arms on
questions affecting the military characteristics of a new design.
Thus the Technical Staff had the responsibility to supervise and
coordinate design and development of AFV's and advise the Chief of
Ordinance on the adoption of a design as standard military item. 30
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Ma j o r Lev i n Campbe ll of t he Ordinance De pa rtment , writing in
1 9 2 9 , c a ll ed fo r the development of a small ex pe rimental mechanized
fo r ce to se r ve as a laboratory for the deve l opment o f new eq ui pme nt .
He fe l t that peacetime development o f a few experimenta l vehicles
wou l d be to the advanta ge in reducing the ti me needed to reach
q uan t ity production in time of wa r .
Some , howeve r , felt th a t
"making pe r fectio n in an experimental veh icle the cr i teri o n fo r
standardization " hampe red design progres s -a s in a Christie type
program . Christie cou l d not operate with in th is system . On occasion , he would submit a design di rectl y t o the using a rm; thus
bypa ssing an d alienating the Ordinance Department .
In a time of li mited funds for research and development programs , the Ordinance Department was unable t o afford a wide variety
of development p ro gr am s. Funds had t o be applied to designs which
could be commercially p roduce d o n a lar ge scale. Struggling to
stretch funds as far as poss ible , the Ordinance Departme nt put its
money on a li ght 8 . 5 ton t a nk.
But Christie's tank upset the
Ordinance Department because the Department could visua l ize much
more spent th an p r actib l e or possible on special p rograms such as
the Christie . 31
In the end neither the Ordinance Department nor Christie had
a method of operat ion which was compatible with the other.
It is
indeed unfor t un a te that neither side cou l d compromise and prod uc e
a satisfactory AFV for the u . S . Whi l e the Infantry and Cavalry
" ado red" the Chr istie tanks, th e spectre o f mechanical unreliability
haunted the Christie series of AFV ' s for over twenty years , and u . S.
armored development remained in th e hands of the Or dinance Departmen t.
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THE BEATLES' EFFECT ON CULTURE
They have not performed together on stage for more than
eleven years. They have not made a record together in eight years .
The formal dissolution of their partnership in a London courtroom
in 1975 was an echo of an ending that came long ago.
Now each of
them is trying to overcome the shadow of a past in \~hich they were
bound together by wealth, fame and adulation of an intensity unequaled in our culture. George Harrison scorns talk of a reunion,
telling us to stop livin g in the past. John Lennon told us years
ago that "the dream is over."l
He was right: When the Beatles broke up in 1 970 amidst l awsuits and recriminations, the 60's were ending also---in spirit as
well as by the calendar.
Bloodshed and bombings on campuses , the
harsh realities behind the hopes for a "Woodstock nation," the
refuse of counter-culture communities, all helped kill the dream .
What remains remarkable now, more than a decade after their
firs t worldwide conquest, is how appealing this dream was; how its
vision of the world gripped so much of a generation; and also how
that dream re-shaped our recent past a nd affects us stil l. \~hat
remains remarkable is how strongly this dream was triggered, nurtured and broadened by one rock 'n' roll band of four Englishmen
whose entire history as a group occured before any of them reached
the age of thirty .
It wi ll be the purpose of this paper to call
attention to the effect of the Beatles' words and music on certain
shifts in American culture and to spell out some of the implications their presence had for subsequent generations (including my
own).
They were originally a product of England, but their influence was ultimately felt the wor l d over. Their very power
guaran tees that an attempt at analysis canno t be fully successful.
Their songs, their films, their lives formed so great a part of
what we listened to and watched and talked about that everyone
still sees the Beatles and hears their songs through a personal
pris m.
And the Beatles themselves never abandoned a sense of selfparod y and put- on.
They were, in Richard Goldstein's phrase, "the
clown-gurus of the sixties."2 Lennon said more than once th at the
Beatles sometimes put elusive references into their songs just to
confuse their more solemn interpreters.
Still, the impact of the Beatles cannot be waved away .
If
the Marx they emulated was Groucho, not Karl, if their wor l d was
a p layground instead of a battleground, they still changed what we
l is tened to and how we listened to it; they helped make rock music
a battering ram for the youth culture's assault on the mainstream,
and that assault in turn changed our culture permanently . And if
D. Scott Furkin
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the "dream" t h e Be a tles helped to create could not sustain itself
in the re a l "lorld , that perha p s s peaks more o f our false hopes
than t o the ir p r o mises.
The y wrote an d sang songs . We turned it
into politics and p hilosop h y and a ro a d map to another way of life .
The Bea tles grew up as children of the first generation of
rock ' n' roll, liste ning to and imitating the music of Little
Richard, Larry Williams , Chuck Berry , El v is Presle y , and the later,
more so phisticated sounds of the Shirelles and the Miracle s . It
was the s p ecial genius of their first mentor, Brian E;:>stein , to
package four Liverpool working - class " rockers" as "mods" by replacing their greas y hair , leather jackets, and on -stage vulgarity
with jackets , ties , smiles , and carefull y groomed , distinctive
haircuts. 3 Just as white artists fi ltered and softened the raw
energy of black artists in the ' 50 ' s , the Beatles were at first
softer, safer versions of energetic rock ' n ' roll musicians . The
words said that they only wanted to hold hands; the rhythm was more
insistent .
By coming into prominence early in 1964, the Beatles probably
saved rock ' n ' roll from extinction.
Rock in the early ' 60 ' s
existed in name onl y ; apart from the soul artists , it was a time
of "scholock rock , " as one writer has called it. 4 By contrast ,
the Beatles provided a sense of musical energy that made success ful a brilliant public -relations effort . Of course , the $50 , 000
used to promote the Beat les' first American appearance in February ,
1964 helped fue l some of the early hysteria . 5
So did the timing of their arrival . Coming as it did less
than a hundred day s after the murder of John Kennedy , the advent
of the Beatl es caught America ready for any diversion to replace
its depression .
The Beatles, however , had more than hype; they had talent .
Even their first hits , "I Want to Hold Your Hand , " "She Loves You ,"
"Please Please Me ," "I Saw Her Standing There" had a hint of harmo nies and melodies more inventive than standard rock tunes. More
important, it became immediatel y apparent that the Beatles were
hipper, more complicated than the bovine rock stars who could not
seem to put four coherent words together .
In the spring of 1964, John Lennon publi shed a book , "In His
Own Write ," which offered word pla y s , puns and black - humor satiri ca l sketches. 6 A few months later came the fi l m "A Hard Day 's
Night " and the Beatles and director Richard Lester created a funny
movie parodying the Beatles ' own image . 7
The real surprise came at the end of 1965 with the release of
the " Ru bber Soul " album . Starting with th at album and continuing
through " Revolver" and" Sgt . Pepper ' s Lone l y Heart ' s Club Band ,"
the Beatles began to throwaway the rigid conventions of rock 'n '
roll music and l y rics . The banal , abstract, second - hand emotions
were replaced with sharp, sometimes mordant portraits of first - hand
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people and e x periences, linked to music th a t was more complica ted
and more compelling than rock had e v er dared attemp t. The Beatles
were dr a wing on their memories and feelings, not those cut from
Tin Pan Al ley cloth.
"Norwegian (';ood" was about an unhappy , inconclu s ive a ff air.
"Michelle" and "Yesterday " were haunting, sentime ntal ballads, and
Paul McCartney even sang part of "!1ichelle" i n French---most rock
singers regarded English as a foreign l a nguage.
"Penny Lane" used
cornets to evoke the sugges tion of a faintly heard band concert on
a long-ago summer day .
Staccato strin g s lent urgency to the sto ry
of "Eleanor Rigby."
These songs were different from the rock music that our elders
had scorned with impunity . Traditionally, roc k 'n' roll was rigidl y
structured:
4/4 tempo, 32 bars, with a limited range of instruments. Before the Beatles, rock producer Phil Spector had revolutionized records by adding strings to the drums, bass, sax, and
guitars, but the chord structure was usually limited to a basic
blues or ballad pattern. Now the Beatles, with the kind of v isibility that made them impossible to ignore, were exp anding the
range of rock, musically and l y rically.
A sintar, a harpsichord
effect, a ragtime piano---everything was possible. S
With the release of "Sgt. Pepper" in the spring of 1967, the
era of rock as a strictly adolescent phenomenon was gone. One
song, "A Day in the Life," with its recital of an ordinary day
combined with a dreamlike sense of dread and anxiety , made it i mpossible to ignore the skills of Lennon and McCartney . Once "Sgt.
Pepper" was recorded, Partisan Review was lauding the Beatles, Ned
Rorem proclaimed that "She's Leav ing Home" ~las "eq ual to any song
Schubert e v er wrote," and a Newsweek critic meant it when he said :
"'Strawberry Fields Forever' (is) a superb Beatleizing of hope and
despair in which the four minstrels regretfully recommend a
Keatsian lotusland of withdrawal from the centrifugal stresses of
the age.,,9
"We're so well established," ~lcCartne y had said in 1966, "that
we can bring fans along with us and stretch the limits of pop."lD
By using their fame to help break through the boundaries of rock,
the Beatles prov ed that they were not the puppets of backstage manipulation.
Instead, they helped to make rock music the music of an
entire international generation. Perhaps for the first time in
history , it was possible to say that tens of millions of people,
defined simpl y by age, were all doing the same thing:
they were
listening to rock 'n' roll. That fact chang ed the popular culture
of the world.
Looking back on the last half of the last decade, it is hard
to think of a cultural innovation that did not carry with it the
influence of rock music, and of the Beatles in p articular: th e
miniskirt, discotheq ues, the graphics of Peter Ma x , the birth of
publications like Rolling Stone, the "mind-bend ing" ef f ects of TV
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commercials, the success of "Laugh-In" on television and "Easy
Rider" in the movies---all these cultural milestones owe something
to the emergence of rock music as the most compelling and pervasive
force in our culture .
This is especially true of the incredible spread of drugs- -marijuana and the hallucinogens most particul a rl y ---among the
youth culture.
From "Rubber Soul" throu gh "Sgt . Pepper," Beatle
music was suffused with a sense of my ster y and my sticism: odd
choral progressions , mysterious instruments, dream- like effects,
and images that did not seem to y ield to "straight" interpretations .
Whether specific songs ( " Lucy in the Sky tvi th Diamonds," "A Little
Help From My Friends") were deliberately referring to drugs is
beside the point . The Beatles were publicl y recounting their LSD
experiences, and their music was replete with antirational sensibility.
Indeed, it was almost a commonplace among contemporaries that
Beatle albums could not be full y understood without the use of a
p l ant or a pill.
Hunter Thompson said , "When the Beatles told us
to turn off our minds and float downstream , we assumed that the key
to this kind of mind-expansion was in drugs . ,,11 Together with "head"
groups like Jefferson Airplane and The Grateful Dead , the Beatl es
were, consciousl y or not , a major influence behind the spread of
drugs .
In this sense , the Beatles are part of a chain : 1) the Beat les
opened up rock ; 2) rock changed the culture; 3) the cu l ture changed
us . Even limited to their impact as musicians , however , the
Beatles were as powerfu l an influence as any group or individual ;
only Bob Dylan stands as their equal .
They tvere always moving; they never stayed with a successfu l
formula.
John Gabree , one of the early rock writers, said that
"their job , and they have done it we ll, has been to travel a few
miles behind the avant- garde , consolidating gains and popu l a rizing
new ideas . "12 By virtue of their fame , then, the Beatles were a
giant amplifier , spreading "the word " on virtually every trend and
mood of the last decade .
It was almost inevitable that , even agains t
their will , their listeners shaped a d re am of politics and lifestyle from the substance of popular music . It is testament both
to the power of rock music and to the i llu sio n s which can be spun
out of impu lses.
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